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Understanding Lockups: Effects in Bankruptcy
and the Market for Corporate Control
Kermit Roosevelt lilt
This Article examines the effects of lockups in the market for corporate
control and bankruptcy. Developments in the analysis of lockups in the
market for corporate control have provided prescriptions that are
accurate from either an ex ante or ex post perspective. This Article
employs auction theory to articulate a synthesis of the current theory that
is satisfactory from both perspectives. Theory addressing lockups in
bankruptcy is unsatisfactory from both an ex ante and ex post context. By
delineating the cmcial differences between bankruptcy and the market for
corporate control, this Article develops appropriate standards for
governing lockups in bankruptcy.
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Introduction
Nineteen ninety-eight was a banner year for mergers and acquisitions.
The dollar value of such corporate combinations doubled from the
preceding year, exceeding two trillion dollars and reaching twenty percent
of the gross national product. 1 Thus, an investigation of the law governing
the devices used in the market for corporate control is particularly timely.
But the economy, like history (or a washing machine; pick your
metaphor), runs in cycles. When the high tide recedes, it will undoubtedly
leave many businesses stranded on the beach, and bankruptcy filings will
increase. The law governing bankruptcy practice is also ripe for
consideration, or soon will be.
Bankruptcy and mergers and acquisitions may seem quite distinct
areas of corporate activity, but they raise some common questions . In
particular, both demand that courts settle the appropriate treatment of
lockups. The term "lockup" encompasses a variety of different devices
sharing a common purpose. This Article will distinguish between different
types of lockups where necessary, but the different types have similar
effects and, for most of the analysis, an understanding of the purpose
suffices. As a loose definition, a lockup is a device by which target
management promises to compensate a bidder if the proposed merger falls
through. Lockups may take a variety of forms : cash breakup fees which
are paid to a would-be acquirer if another bid is ultimately accepted;
options on treasury stock with an exercise price set near the bidder 's offer
price; or "crown jewels" options on a desirable portion of the target's
assets. 2 Such agreements obviously play an important role in contests for
corporate control. They are, at least on the conventional understanding, a
means by which target management can favor a particular bidder,
increasing the odds that the target company will end up in the hands of a
3
friendly, rather than a hostile, suitor. But lockups have a range of uses
broader than the standard merger context. They can be employed in any
type of sale; a seller may always offer a bidder some compensation if the
See Charles Weller, AntitniSl, NAT'L L.J., A ug . 24, 1998, at 86.
2
See Stephen Fraidin & Jon D. Hanson, Toward Un locking Lockups, I 03 Y ALE L.J. 1739,
1747 ( 1994).
AsPa rtI C discusses , this view is oversi mplified , if not flatly incorrect.
3
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deal is not consummated. Consequently, lockups also feature quite
prominently in the bankruptcy context, where insolvent firms sell off
assets, engage in friendly mergers, and are sometimes the targets of hostile
. . .
5
acqms1t10ns.
The first and second parts of this Article address the effects of
lockups in the market for corporate control. This is relatively well-trodden
ground: following a seminal article by Ian Ayres, 6 a number of scholars
have recently bestowed their attention on the lockup .7 The theoretical view
of lockups in the market for corporate control has passed through several
distinct phases; Part I of this Article outlines the dialectical development
of that theory. The first generation, still dominant in the Delaware courts, 8
reasoned that lockups typically allow target management to pursue its own
interests at the expense of target shareholders. 9 First generation scholars
thus called for severe judicial scrutiny or outright bans of lockups .
Revisionist scholars attempted to demonstrate that these concerns were
overstated or even illusory, and demanded greater judicial deference . 10
Finally, the most recent scholarship argues for the reinstatement of the
4
Granting a lockup to a potential buyer of course makes little sense if the sale does not
have the characteristics of an auction, since it is only in an auction-type sale that there exists a serious
threat that the seller cannot simply pick the buyer. The Williams Act, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454
(1968) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(f), 78n(d)-(f) (1994)), the legal regime
governing mergers, and the Bankruptcy Code, II U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1994), both impose auctionstyle requirements on sales. The SEC, under the authority of the Williams Act, creates a de facto
auction regime by imposing a delay which allows other bidders to intervene. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14el(a) (1999). Delaware corporate common law will then require managers not to play favorites among
bidders. See Revlon , Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc ., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986). The
Bankruptcy Code requires judicial approval of a sale of assets outside the ordinary course of business.
See II U.S.C. § 363(b). Approval requires a hearing, creating delay, and will not be forthco ming in the
face of a higher bid.
For bankruptcy cases evaluating the legality of lockups, see, for example, In re Tiara
5
Motorcoach Corp., 212 B.R. 133 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1997); In re Bidermann Indus. U.S.A., Inc., 203
B.R. 547 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997); In re S.N.A. Nut Co., 186 B.R. 98, 101-02 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1995);
In re America West Airlines, 166 B.R. 908 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1994).
6
Ian Ayres, Analyzing Stock Lock-Ups: Do Target Treasury Sales Foreclose or Facilitate
Takeover Auctions?, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 682 (1990).
See. e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Exclusive Merger Agreements and Lock-Ups in
7
Negotiated Corporate Acquisitions. 75 MINN. L. REV. 239 (1990); Fraidin & Hanson, supra note 2;
Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Lockups and the Market for Cotporate Control, 48 STAN. L. REV.
1539 (1996); David A. Skeel, Jr., A Reliance Damages Approach to Corporate Lockups, 90 Nw. U. L.
Rev. 564 (1996).
8
See. e.g., Paramount Communications Inc. v. QYC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34 (Del.
1994); Mills Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261 (Del. 1989); Rev/on, 506 A.2d at 173.
With respect to judicial treatment of lockups in changes of corporate control, this Article focuses on
Delaware common law. Because bankruptcy law is federal, the Article considers a broader range of
jurisdictions in that context.
See ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 572-73 (1986); Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case
9
for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers: A Reply and Extension, 35 STAN. L. REv. 23, 47 (1982);
Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Auctions and Sunk Costs in Tender Offers, 35 STAN. L.
REv. 1, 15 ( 1982); Alan Schwartz, Search Theory and the Tender Offer Auction, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG.
229, 238 ( 1986).
I0
See. e.g., Ayres, supra note 6; Fraidin & Hanson, supra note 2.
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earliest views against the claims of the revisionists. 11
Part II of this Article moves beyond that scholarship. It demonstrates
that the academic analysis to date has not developed an account that deals
adequately with both the specific consequences of lockups in individual
transactions and the general effects of a rule permitting or prohibiting
lockups. The revisionist account is largely correct in its analysis of the
effects of lockups in individual transactions (the "ex post" effects) but fails
to appreciate the consequences of a permissive rule (the "ex ante" effects).
Its conclusion is wrong, but its reasoning largely right. 12 The most recent
account fails to displace the revisionist account but proposes a more
desirable rule. Its reasoning is wrong, but its conclusion largely right. Part
II evaluates the competing claims and uses auction theory to develop a
synthesis that employs accurate reasoning to obtain the correct result. It
endeavors to present both the forest and the trees; it combines the insights
of its predecessors and presents for the first time what I believe is a picture
accurate at both levels. 13
11
See Kahan & Klausner, supra note 7.
12
Generally, Fraidin and Hanson are guilty of a sort of analytic virtuosity; with acute
insight they draw out a number of beneficial transaction-specific consequences of lockups, but seem
not to notice that some of these conflict with each other and also with the claimed pre-transaction
benefits. For example, they write that "[n]o loyal target would grant and no bidder could credibly
demand a lockup for investments already made and in identifying and evaluating the target," Fraidin &
Hanson, supra note 2, at 1814, but "the bidder can expect to receive a lockup in those circumstances in
which the target board would like to sell to the bidder." !d. at 1827. It is unclear what would motivate
the target board to grant a lockup to this first "desired" bidder, since the result of such a lockup, if a
higher-valuing bidder appears and wins the auction, is decreased shareholder revenue, which target
boards, as shareholders, want to maximize. !d. at 1804-05. Lockups can increase the profits from
searching ("returns to search") in common value auctions, id. at 1827, but they can also be used to
capture the entire surplus of such auctions. !d. at 1829. The same is roughly true for independent
private value auctions. Compare id. at 1828-29 with id. at 1829 (noting that in an independent private
value auction "the highest valuing bidder can win the target at some price below the ideal auction
price," but that this problem would not arise in a full enforcement regime). The basic problem here is
that there is a tension between revenues and returns to search. It is not a zero-sum game, because in at
least some circumstances the available surplus can be increased by reducing transaction costs , but the
two goals are usually in conflict and cannot be served simultaneously. One effect will predominate,
and an ex ante analysis will have to face the fact that lockups are not panaceas.
To see the effect of distinguishing between the two levels, imagine the following
13
scenarios . First, it might be the case that lockups reduce shareholder revenue in individual transactions
but increase it on the whole . Suppose that, after an auction is held, management, having identified the
highest valuer, proceeds to negotiate with that bidder using the winning bid as a starting point. Returns
to shareholders on the transaction will be maximized by thi s approach; however, bidders may find their
returns under such a regime so small as to make search and bidding a bad investment. In this case, the
frequency of takeovers would be greatly reduced and shareholders as a class could be worse off,
because they would seldom receive takeover premiums. If lockups were permitted, bidders could
demand that management in effect bind itself to accept the highest bid . Although shareholders would
receive smaller profits in the particular transaction, the disincentive to search would be reduced and
shareholders as a class would be better off.
Conversely, it could be that lockups make shareholders better off in the individual case but
worse off in general. Suppose that management uses a lockup to induce a second bidder to enter an
auction, thereby driving up the price. Revenues to shareholders will be increased, but the redu ced
return to bidders could drive search below the point optimal from the shareholder perspective.
My purpose here is not to argue for either of these scena rios, both of which will be considered in
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In contrast to the successive generations of theories of lockups in the
context of mergers and acquisitions, the academic analysis of lockups in
bankruptcy has shown little movement. The current approach to such
lockups is emphatic and univocal but strikingly underdeveloped. Two
14
represent almost the entirety of the academy's
scholarly pieces
contribution. Both join the first generation's call for increased judicial
scrutiny of lockups in bankruptcy, and both have been cited with approval
I"
by courts. '
Part III of the Article demonstrates that while the mergers and
acquisitions literature displays both the correct analysis and the correct
prescription-though not in the same article-the dominant bankruptcy
analysis features the worst of both worlds. A merger or sale in bankruptcy
differs in important ways from its counterpart outside Chapter 11.
Sensitive neither to the true ex post effects of lockups nor to the unique ex
ante features of bankruptcy, current bankruptcy scholarship deploys faulty
reasoning and reaches the wrong result. Analyzing the differences between
bankruptcy and the broader market for corporate control, Part III shows
that lockups granted by companies in Chapter 11 must be governed by
different standards. However, before examining the factors that distinguish
bankruptcy from the ordinary mergers and acquisitions context, it IS
necessary to develop a general understanding of the effects of lockups.
I.

An Intellectual History of Lockups

A.

The Theoretical Framework

There are two distinct positive perspectives from which to analyze
lockups, and two distinct normative criteria by which to evaluate them.
The two perspectives are what I have called "ex ante" and "ex post." An
ex post perspective looks to the effect of lockups in individual
greater detail later, but simply to note the possibility of conflict between the rule that is best for one
party in a particular tran saction and the rule that is best for that party in general.
14
See Bruce Markell, The Case Against Breakup Fees in Bankruptcy, 66 AM. BANKR. L.J.
349 (1992); Paul B. Lackey, Note, An Empirical Survey and Proposed Bankruptcy Code Section
Concerning the Propriety of Bidding Incentives in a Bankruptcy Sale of Assets, 93 COLUM. L. REv.
720 ( 1993 ). Mark Hebbeln has brought economic analysis to bear on breakup fees, urging that they
should be upheld. See Mark F. Hebbeln, Note, The Economic Case for Judicial Deference to Brenk-Up
Fee Agreements in Bankruptcy, I J BANKR. DEV. J. 475 (1997). The note does not, however, represent
an application of revisionist scholarship to the bankruptcy context; indeed, it does not discuss any of
the merger and acquisition lockup scholarship. Hebbeln 's central claim is that breakup fees may induce
a first bid. !d. at 492-96. In fact, howe ver, as Part III.C will show, the value of a first-bidder lockup in a
bankruptcy sale is that it may prevent a wasteful auction from taking place.
15
See In re S.N.A Nut Co, 186 B.R . 98, 101-02 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1995) (citing Lackey,
supra note 14; Markell, supra note 14); In re America W. Airlines, 166 B.R. 908,912 (Bankr. D. Ariz.
1994) (citing Markell, supra note 14).
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transactions; an ex ante perspective considers the more general
consequences of different legal rules. Corporate derivative suits against
disloyal directors provide a usefully simple illustration of the distinction .
From an ex post perspective, it may be inefficient to pursue such suits. The
costs can be substantial, and will likely exceed the expected recovery. 16
From an ex ante perspective, however, a policy of suing in every case is
likely to have a substantial general deterrent effect. Even if each individual
suit is inefficient, the policy favoring such suits reduces costs overall. (A
similar, if somewhat more trite, example is a merchant's policy of
prosecuting all shoplifters.)
With respect to the treatment of lockups, the point is the following :
law casts shadows. Legal rules do more than determine the outcome of
particular cases; because people know what the outcomes will be, they
tailor their actions accordingly. Bidders will behave differently in a world
in which lockups are permitted than they would in one in which lockups
were forbidden. The attempt to promote particular values through law
must consider not only the effects of rules in cases in which they are
applied, but also how they shape behavior by lurking in the background.
Analysts hoping to develop policy prescriptions, then, must use the ex ante
perspective, for it is only by understanding the broader consequences of
rules that we may know if they are desirable.
The two evaluative criteria may be termed maximization of target
shareholder revenue and maximization of social wealth. The first demands
simply that acquisitions take place at the highest attainable price in order
to provide the greatest gain to target shareholders. 17 The second urges that
assets be moved to their highest valuing users with a minimum of
transaction costs, and may be more simply characterized as the efficiency
norm.
These two analytical disjunctions create four possible windows
through which to look at lockups. The four possibilities are: ( 1) ex ante
analysis seeking to promote target shareholder revenue; (2) ex ante
analysis seeking to promote efficiency; (3) ex post analysis seeking to
promote target shareholder revenue; and (4) ex post analysis seeking to
promote efficiency. Courts have tended to opt for the third view,
combining ex post analysis with promotion of target shareholder revenue. I
will suggest that both components of this perspective are mistaken, but
they are understandable and indeed all but inevitable, given the judicial
role. Courts decide individual cases; thus the ex post orientation is the one
presented to them. They often fail to distinguish it from the ex ante, in that
they tend to suppose that the rule that reaches the desired result ex post
16
17
1986).
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will also do so ex ante. But if the correct rule s for ex ante and ex post
maximization of a particular value do not coincide (and Part II will
demonstrate that they do not with respect to lockups), the benefits that
seemed so tangible on the ex post analysis will prove to be a m1rage,
disappearing in light of the ex ante effects.
Ex post analysis is, of course, an essential prerequisite to ex ante
evaluation. The cumulative effect of a rule permitting a certain tactic
cannot be divined without a precise understanding of the effects of that
tactic in the individual case. But in the final evaluation , it is the ex ante
effects that will be experienced. That is, a merchant that pursues the
"inefficient" (from the ex post perspective) policy of prosecuting
shoplifters will reap the benefits of deterrence on its bottom line. The
judicial ex post perspective, though understandable, is an obvious and
serious mistake.
If courts have erred, have commentators gotten it right? My answer
will be: not quite. Academics are surely aware of the fallacy of pure ex
post analysis, but they are not always as punctiliously observant as they
might be. Existing scholarly treatments of lockups differ in the degrees of
emphasis they place on ex post and ex ante analysis . Each, I will suggest,
misses at least one perspective. One contribution of this Article is to
distinguish sharply ex ante from ex post analysis, employing the latter only
as the first step toward the former.
This leaves the question of whether the goal that law should pursue is
maximization of target shareholder revenue or overall efficiency . The
judicial focus on target shareholder revenue is not so clearly mistaken as
its ex post perspective. Indeed, it might superficially seem to be demanded
by the fundamental axioms of corporate law: if managers are compelled by
their duty of loyalty to further shareholder interests, 19 surely, one might
think, they must seek to maximize shareholder revenue in changes of
control. That is what the law should require of them. It is, in fact, what the
law does require, 20 but the reasoning underlying this legal regime also
makes an ex post/ex ante mistake. It may be the case with respect to
18
Indeed, Joy v. North makes precisely thi s error:
Where the court determines that the likel y recov e rabl e da mages discounted by the
probability of a finding of liability are le ss th a n th e c osts to the corporation in
continuing the action, it should dismiss the cas e. The co sts which may properly be
taken into account are attorney's fees and other out-of-pocket expenses related to
the litigation and time spent by corporate personnel preparing for and participating
in the trial.
692 F.2d at 892. This is a test for whether the action is in the corporation's interest from an ex post
perspective; it omits consideration of the deterrent value of suits from the ex ante perspective.
19
See. e.g., Dennis J. Block et al., Defensive Measures in Anticipation of and in Response
to Unsolicited Takeover Prosposals, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 623, 623-25 (1997) (discussing duty of
loyalty).
20
See. e.g., Rev/on, 506 A.2d at 182. Courts are mi staken in thinking that thi s regime serves
target shareholder interes ts , but they seem quite committed to it.
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lockups (and again, Part II will demonstrate that it is) that target
shareholders in general are better served by management action that does
not maximize their revenue in individual transactions-as long as all
1
managers take that course of action? True promotion of target shareholder
revenue, then , must look beyond the individual transaction to the general
effects of the rule embodied in the transaction.
Of course, acquiring companies usually have shareholders too.
Indeed, the same company may find itself either a target or a bidder. Most
significantly, most shareholders hold diversified portfolios and are likely
to own stock in both bidders and targets. Thus, a serious attempt to
promote shareholder welfare in general might simply coincide with the
efficiency norm. If the aim is to make all shareholders better off, surely
this is achieved by maximizing the value of all publicly held corporations,
which requires precisely that corporate assets be moved to their highest
valuing users with a minimum of transaction costs. There is also an
obvious case to be made that general utilitarian principles of morality lead
22
to the efficiency norm. Both these assertions are disputable, but
efficiency is the desideratum of most corporate scholars, 23 and this Article
24
will proceed in that vein.
In assessing efficiency ex ante, we must be concerned not only with
how lockups affect individual acquisitions, but also with how they affect
the incentives to engage in those acquisitions. Searching for an
inefficiently managed or undervalued company is costly, and fewer
acquisitions will take place if the profits from searching ("returns to
search") are reduced. The goal is not only to move assets to their highest
valuers with a minimum of transaction costs in the individual acquisition,
21
As we shall see, lockups thus present a situation analytically roughly equivalent to the
prisoner's dilemma chestnut of game theory. A group of individuals (target shareholders) face a
situation in which all will do better if all (more precisely, all their agents, i.e., management) follow a
particular course of action. However, "defectors" can increase their returns by straying from that
course of action. The question with such collective action problems is how to prevent defection, and
the answer here, we shall see, is to forbid it. Of course, much of our law is devoted to precisely the task
of restraining parties from taking actions that would be in their immediate self-interest but the threat of
which would prevent collectively beneficial arrangements. For example, contract law holds parties to
their promises even when it would be in their immediate self interest to breach or renegotiate, because
without the ability to make such binding promises, no one would enter into contracts. Similarly, the
Bankruptcy Code prevents creditors from attempting to collect before each other. See II U.S.C. § 362
(1994) (automatic stay provision). Without such a rule, an individual creditor might thereby recover
the full amount of its claim, but the practice would lead to the dismemberment of debtor firms worth
more as going concerns, reducing the return to creditors overall. See Alan Schwartz, A Contract
Theory Approach to Business Bankruptcy, 107 Yale L.J. 1807, 1807 (1998).
22
See generally Alan Schwartz, The Fairness of Tender Offer Prices in Utilitarian Theory,
17 J. LEGAL STUD 165 (1986).
23
See. e.g., Peter Cramton & Alan Schwartz, Using Auction Theory To Inform Takeover
Regulation, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 27 (1991); Frank Easterbrook & Daniel Fischel, The Proper Role of
a Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REv. 1161 (1981 ).
24
Part lii will argue that maximizing sale price may be a worthy goal in the bankruptcy
context, but the point of the argument is that higher sale prices promote efficiency related values.
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but also to maximize the number of such acquisitions . Achieving this goal
requires an understanding of the ex post effects of lockups and also how
those effects echo back into parties' behavior. My method will be to start
by canvassing the existing theory before deploying my O\vn analysis.

B.

The First Generation of Theory

First generation theory starts from the premise that the interests of
target managers and shareholders conflict when a takeover occurs. 25
Management's jobs are often at stake, and target directors have an
incentive either to reject valuable offers or to cut disloyal deals with
particular bidders.
Current corporate law clearly permits management to pursue the first
of these courses. Rejecting all offers from behind the safety of a poison
pill, while criticized by scholars, 26 has been permitted by Delaware
courts. 27 The second option is more difficult. Federal law prevents the sale
of a company from being swiftly consummated, 28 and if other bidders
emerge in the delay created, management may not favor the initial bidder
over its rivals . As Revlon's directors learned to their sorrow, 29 once the
sale of the company becomes inevitable, the eponymous "Revlon duties"
are triggered and management must seek only to maximize the sale price. 30
25
See. e.g., Bennett v. Propp, 187 A.2d 405,409 (Del. 1962); CLARK, supra note 9, at 58889; Ronald J. Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive Tactics in
Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REV. 819, 819 (1981 ).
26
See. e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 23.
27
See. e.g., Paramount Communications, Inc . v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990);
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985); Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500
A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985); cf Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 43
n.l3 (Del. 1993) In each of these decisions, the Delaware court authorized a firm's board of directors
to simply decline an offer that it believed was not in the interest of the shareholders. Many states have
amplified this trend by enacting anti-takeover statutes that allow management, in evaluating a tender
offer, to take into account the interests of workers and the community. See, e.g., Mark G. Robilotti,

Codetermination, Stakeholder Rights. and Hostile Takeovers: A Reevaluation of the Evidence from
Abroad, 38 HARV. INT'L L.J. 536, 536-39 (1997) (discussing stakeholder anti-takeover statutes). Such
statutes make it easier for management to reject even a bid that is clearly in the interests of target
shareholders; they are commonly seen as a manifestation of corporate "capture" of state legislatures.
See. e.g., Roberta Romano, The Political Economy of Takeover Statutes, 73 VA. L. REv. Ill, 134-38
(1987). Delaware caselaw similarly allows management to consider "other constituencies." See Mills
Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan, Inc., 559 A .2d 1261, 1282 n.29 (Del. 1988).
28
The SEC, pursuant to the Williams Act, requires a tender offer to be held open for twenty
days, in order to allow competing bids to emerge. See 17 C.F.R. § 240 .14e-l (a) (1999).
29
Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 180 (Del. 1986).
30
/d. Rev/on is often characterized as imposing a "level playing field" requirement. See.
e.g. , Block eta!., supra note 19, at 629. This is not entirely accurate; the Delaware courts have at least
recognized the possibility that differential treatment of bidders may increase the ultimate sale price. If
so, management may-indeed, should-discriminate. What is required is neutrality of judgment in
comparing competing bidders (management must not be influenced by its own interests), not
necessarily neutrality of treatment. See. e.g., West Point-Pepperell, Inc. v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 542
A.2d 770, 782 (Del. Ch. 1988) ("[T]he board may tilt the playing field if, but only if, it is in the
shareholders' interest to do so."). With respect to lockups, however, the praxis of Delaware courts
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In Fraidin and Hanson's evocative phrasing, management can say no, but
not yes- it may reject all bidders, but cannot accept a particular bid
without effectively conducting an auction. 31
The first generation of theory saw lockups as a device target
management could use to circumvent the unbiased auction requirement, to
favor particul ar bidders. Because of the potential for self-dealing thus
created, first generation commentators urged enhanced scrutiny. 32 Most
first generation scholarship operated from an ex post perspective and
33
sought to promote efficiency. In this account, the danger is that
management, by favoring a particular bidder in return for some benefit
(such as guaranteed tenure), may prevent the highest valuing bidder from
acquiring the target corporation.
The Delaware courts adopted this positive analysis, though with a
slightly different normative slant. As discussed above, courts tend to
employ an ex post analysis and seek to maximize shareholder revenue; this
is precisely the point of Revlon duties. Lockups are threatening from this
perspective because they reduce the price bidders are willing to pay for the
target. All other things being equal, they reduce the price at which a sale
34
will take place.
Judicial approval of the first generation's ex post analysis has
enshrined distrust of lockups in the caselaw. 35 This is thoroughly
unsurprising . If an unbiased auction is desired, devices that undermine that
procedure are to be disapproved. What is slightly more surprising is the
extent of the disapproval. While some lower Delaware courts have
suggested that some lockups may be upheld, 36 their bite has been worse
than their bark. Courts strike down lockups in all cases where a "lockedout" bidder37 offers a higher bid conditioned on invalidation of the

suggests that the leve l playing fi eld rule is a de facto requirement. See Fraidin & Hanson, supra note 2,
at 1743 n.l3, 17 65-66; infra text accompanying notes 35-39.
31
See Fraidin & Hanson, supra note 2, at 1743.
See, e.g. , Bainbridge, supra note 7.
32
33
Some first generati on scholars evaluated lockups from an ex ante perspective, also
finding them und es irable. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 9, at 238 (arguing that lockups reduce returns
to search and should be prohibited).
34
For example, if Alpha values Target at $750 million and Beta values it at $800 million,
the sale price in an auction will ordinarily be $750 million, the point at which Alpha will stop bidding.
But if Target 's management has granted a lockup of $50 million-to either Alpha or Beta-Alpha will
stop bidding at $700 million and shareholders will receive $50 million less from the sale. Of course,
"all other things" are not usually equal; if they were, lockups would be per se disloyal and not of much
academic interest.
See. e.g., Paramount Communications Inc . v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34 (Del.
35
1993); Revl on, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A .2d 173 (Del. 1986).
36
See, e.g., West Point-Pepperell , Inc. v. J.P. Stevens & Co., Inc., 542 A.2d 770, 782 (Del.
C h. 1988) ("[T)he board may tilt the playing field if, but only if, it is in the shareholders' interest to do
so.").
37
"Locked-in" refers to the bidder receiving the lockup and " locked-out" to rivals.
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lockup.38
Lockups granted in situations where no bidder was willing to make a
higher offer anyway are "enforceable," but obviously unimportant. More
important is the fact that under this rule, even lockups that do not prevent
the hi gher bid are voidable. If a rival bidder knows that it can get a lockup
enjoined, it will always do so if the value of the lockup exceeds litigation
costs. Even if it would have been willing to outbid the "locked-in" bidder,
it will do better by outbidding on the condition that the lockup is
invalidated . The result is that lockups can play no real role in the market
for corporate control. A lockup will have value to the recipient only if it
turns out that a rival bidder is (or would have been, without the lockup)
willing to exceed the recipient ' s bid. But lockups are set aside in precisely
such circumstances . Thus a lockup cannot have value to the recipient and
cannot have any use in negotiations. The tool simply has been taken out of
management ' s han ds. 39
C.

The Revisionists: Ayres and Fraidin & Hanson

The first generation analysis relies on the premi se that lockups can
determine who ultimately acquires a target corporation. If not, target
boards cannot award victory to a favored bidder in return for job security. 40
After all, if management cannot determine the winner, it cannot pick a
bidder with whom to negotiate. Thus the danger of management
bargaining away gains that should accrue to the shareholders (i.e. , the
threat to the shareholder revenue norm) seems minimal. Similarly, if
lockups cannot determine who wins an auction, they obviously cannot
prevent the highest valuer from acquiring the target. Thus, lockups do not
threaten the efficiency norm. To reach such a benign view of lockups, the
revisionists attack the first generation 's essential premise through a more
sophisticated ex post analysis.
38
See. e.g. , QVC, 6 37 A. 2d at 34; Rev/on , 506 A. 2d at 173. These cases are ampl y and ably
su mmari zed in Fraidin & Han son, supra note 2, at 1748-66. Extended recapitulation here would be
red undant, and the onl y important con ceptual point is the simple one that the de facto Delaware rule is
that a lockup will be set aside if doing so will elicit a hi gher competing bid .
This is, of course, a classic ex post/ex ante mistake. Entranced by the poss ibility of the
39
higher bid that is apparently precluded by the lockup, courts have failed to ask whether the locked-in
bidder would ha ve made his bid without the lockup . By adopting a legal standard under which
managers cann ot give that lockup to induce a bid, they will in many cases cause the auction to end
earlier rather than later, and at a lower, rather than a hi gher price. See infra Part II.B (discussing use of
loc kups to increase reve nue by inducin g entry).
40
Lockups do have value, of course, since they are effectively cash payments to losing
bidders. But a losing bidder is in no pos iti on to offe r management job security, and while it could
conce ivabl y offe r a cash ki ckback in return , this beha vior reaches depths o f illegality tha t ou r anal ysis
can sa fel y ignore. Such blatant d isloyalty is al ways a threat, but it is handl ed by the du ty o f loy alty
(and, in the takeove r con tex t, by th e ex tensive dis closure requirements of the securities laws), no t by
re mov ing all opportun ities for graft. See Fraidin & Hanson, supra note 2, at 1786-87.
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The revisionist movement starts with an insight developed by Ian
Ayres. 41 While a lockup, whose value is paid by the target company,
reduces the amount that locked-out bidders are willing to pay for the
42
target, it has exactly the same effect on the locked-in bidder. The
consequence is that although a lockup may effectively reduce the cardinal
amount of every bidder's valuation, it does not affect their ordinal
sequence.
To see this, suppose Alpha values Target at $575 million and Beta
values Target at $600 million. If Alpha receives a lockup worth $50
million in return for a bid of $510 million, Target is then worth only $550
million to Beta, and Beta will bid only that high. Alpha still values Target
at $575 million, but this does not mean that he will outbid Beta. Because
Alpha receives a profit of $50 million by losing the auction, he will bid
only up to $525 million, the point at which he is indifferent between
winning and losing. Thus, in an auction, Beta can still win with a bid of
$526 million, and he will be willing to bid that much, since he still values
Target at $550 million.
That the order of valuations is unchanged does not, however, mean
that a lockup cannot change the identity of the auction winner. Ayres
points out further that a greater-than-expectation lockup can foreclose rival
43
bidders. Suppose that the lockup granted to Alpha in the above example
is worth $100 million rather than $50 million. Alpha would now rather
lose the auction than win at his bid of $510 million, but Target is worth
only $500 million to Beta, and he will not beat the bid of $510 million .
Since only greater-than-expectation lockups can affect who wins an
auction, Ayres claims that only they can serve as tools of management
44
self-interest. Thus, a reviewing court should add the lockup and the bid
4I
Ayres, supra note 6.
42
"Exactly" is true in the case of a breakup fee; "proportionately" (which preserves
ordinality) is true in the case of issuance of options on treasury stock. See Fraidin & Hanson, supra
note 2, at 1771 n.J 13.
43
"Greater-than-expectation" means that the value of the lockup exceeds the profit to the
bidder from winning the auction at the corresponding bid. In other words, a bidder with a greater-thanexpectation lockup would rather not win the auction. See Ayres, supra note 6, at 693.
44
Ayres , supra note 6, at 707. It might be supposed that a "crown jewels" lockup could
have different effects by destroying competing bidders' synergy gains. The error in this supposition is
that it overlooks the fact that if the synergy gains from an acquisition inhere in a particular component
of the target, granting a bidder a lockup on that component will probably also destroy his incentive to
bid for the whole company. It will thus function simply as a greater-than-expectation lockup. The only
real difference between a crown jewels lockup and a breakup fee is that a greater-than-expectation
crown jewels lockup forecloses competing bidders regardless of their valuations.
Suppose that if the lockup entirely destroys synergy gains, all bidders' valuations will be
reduced to the market price (below market price seems likely, but I assume market price here).
Suppose the market prices Target at $100 million, Alpha values it at $200 million, and Beta at $250
million. In return for a bid of $150 million, Target grants Alpha a lockup option on the crown jewels
with an exercise price of $70 million. Even if the difference between the market price and the bidders'
valuations is due entirely to the presence of the crown jewels, Beta will still be willing to bid $169
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price and ask if this sum exceeds the bidder's possible valuation. Lockups
that do are potentially foreclosing and should be enjoined; those that do
not should not.
Stephen Fraidin and Jon Hanson, in the fullest flowering of revisionist
theory, claim to take this approach one step further. Starting from Ayres's
fundamental insight that some lockups have no foreclosing effect, they
part company with him on some details of analysis and, to a greater extent,
on the policy prescriptions thereby derived . First, Fraidin and Hanson note
that even potentially foreclosing lockups will not always alter the outcome
of an auction, because a potentially foreclosing lockup may not foreclose
45
the highest valuing bidder. Second, they claim that Ayres's proposed
standard is difficult to implement in practice. Identifying a potentially
foreclosing lockup requires a reviewing court to ascertain the bidder's
reservation price. This is no easy task. Indeed, if reservation prices were
readily apparent, there would be no need for an auction mechanism to
force this information into the open. 46 Anticipating this difficulty, Ayres
suggests that only unmistakably foreclosing lockups should be enjoined, 47
but even this criterion requires courts to set a zone of reasonableness for
reservation prices. Applying Ayres's standard to actual corporate practice,
Fraidin and Hanson note that in the average 1980s takeover, the acquirer
paid a premium of fifty percent over market price for'the target's stock. 48
This premium is only a lower benchmark for the acquirer's reservation
price, and in consequence it seems hard to be confident that even a one
hundred percent premium falls outside the zone of reasonableness. With
million. (He may prefer to negotiate with Alpha, but he is willing to bid $169 million.) If he wins at
$169 million, he gets the company, loses the crown jewels and his synergy gains, but gets the option
price of $70 million: a value of $170 million for a price of $169 million. (I am assuming here that the
exercise price of the option is paid to the winning bidder, rather than to target shareholders, i.e., the
option is exercised after the sale.) The lockup can be made foreclosing by setting the exercise price at
$49 million. Then no matter what Beta's valuation as a result of synergy gains, he will not bid $169
million.
This can be shown as a general result: Let M be the market price, P the option price, S Alpha's
synergy gain, and B the bid price. Alpha's lockup is greater than expectation if Alpha does better by
not winning the auction. This condition obtains when the difference between Alpha's synergy gain and
the option price (Alpha's return if it loses) is greater than the difference between the target's value to
Alpha (the market price plus the synergy gain) and the bid: S- P > M + S- B. This simplifies to P +
M < B; that is, it is the condition that Alpha's bid exceeds the sum of the market valuation and the
option price. Beta's return from outbidding Alpha is P + M- B. When the lockup is greater than
expectation (i.e., P + M < B), P + M- B < 0 and Alpha 's return is negative, regardless of potential
synergy gains.
Even a Jess-than-expectation lockup can be foreclosing if the optioned asset is a necessary but
not a sufficient component of synergy gains. And results may differ if potential acquirers' synergy
gains come from different pieces of the target. But the likely result of a foreclosing crown jewels
lockup is simply negotiation between bidders, with assets moving to their highest valuing users. See
Fraidin & Hanson, supra note 2, at 1788-1803.
45
Seeid.at1774-75.
46
Seeid.at1775-76.
47
Ayres, supra note 6, at 706-07.
48
Fraidin & Hanson, supra note 2, at 1778.
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this wide a zone, however, the effect of Ayres's approach would be to
uphold the vast majority of lockups actually granted, since lockups are
typicall y under fi ve percent of the purchase price.49 Ayres's approach,
Fraidin and Hanson conclude, would end up "serv[ing] only as a safe
harbor for di sloyal boards. " 50
Fraidin and Hanson 's most ambitious claim is that even foreclosing
lockups are not to be feared. To reach thi s conclusion they invoke "the
basic lesson of the Coase theorem" 51 -if transaction costs are sufficiently
low, assets will end up with the highest valuer regardless of initial
entitlements . A bidder who wins an auction because of a foreclosing
lockup can simply turn around and sell the company to a foreclosed higher
val uer ("resale"), or even pay the higher valuer to top its bid (''presale"). 52
In sum , bidders can contract around foreclosing lockups . While lockups
may affect the outcome of auctions, they do not affect who ultimately
acquires the target.
This claim has important consequences for how we think about
lockups. The first-generation theory holds that lockups are offered in
exchange for promises to retain management. If firms end up with the
higher valuer anyway, the lockup recipient cannot help management. 53
This being so, management's ability to help itself is limited largely to
realizing a profit on the target shares that it ho1ds .54 Thus, management's
incentives align with maximization of target shareholder revenue.
Moreover, since the highest valuer will be willing to pay the most,
management's incentives also line up with the efficiency norm. In sum,
lockups cannot threaten efficiency, and there is reason to suppose that they
will be used to promote both efficiency and shareholder revenues . The

49
See Robert C. Schwenke! & Judith R. Thoyer, Advanced Doing Deals: A Strategic
Approach to Completing the Transaction, I 055 P.L.I./CORP. 59, 68 (1998).
50
Fraidin & Hanson, supra note 2, at 1779. Of course, Fraidin and Hanson have no quarrel
with this result. Since they believe that the specter of disloyal management employing lockups for its
se lfi sh end s is mere phantasm, they advocate de jure, not just de facto , enforcement of all lockups. !d.
at 1779 n.\52.
51
ld.at\744.
52
See id. at 1788- 180 I.
53
At leas t, not by offeri ng job security. As discu ssed supra note 40, the lockup reci pient
conceivabl y could make a cash payment or, less obviously, provide alternate employment for ousted
managers. But, also as di scussed supra note 40, such extremes of dishon esty make analysis very
difficult. It is hardly worth ascertaining the incentiv e e ffects of various legal regimes if we assume that
managers will engage in blatantly cri mina l acts. It makes more sense to evaluate legal rules with the
assumption that ac tors will behave legall y . Fraidin and Hanson make the further po int that a well
developed legal reg ime governing information di sc los ure exists to prevent such behavior. Fraidin &
Hanson, supra note 2, at 1786, 1834 nn.\80- 83.
54
Management typically holds "a quantity of ta rge t shares that is substanti a l in re lation to
eac h board member' s wealth." !d. at 1804-05. A related Fraidin-Hanson argument is that even if
man agement does receiv e some sid e compensati on from a favored bidder, a higher-valuing bidder
co uld offer both a better public price and a better side pay ment. !d. at 1785-86. This assumes, of
course, that all bidders are equally inclin ed to graft, whic h may not be the case.
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revisionist account maintains that all lockups should be enforced: "like
chicken soup, [they] can't hurt but may well help." 55

D.

Th e Reactionaries: Kahan & Klausner

Everything old eventually becomes new again, and corporate
scholarship is no exception. In the most recent article on lockups, Marcel
Kahan and Michael Klausner argue that lockups can affect the outcome of
bidding contests and decry their effects on the disciplinary function of the
market for corporate control, echoing the classic tenets of first-generation
56
scholarship.
Kahan and Klausner maintain that lockups can affect auctions
57
because they can determine who bids. Bidding is costly, and potential
acquirers will enter auctions only if their expected returns exceed bidding
costs. A lockup granted to the first bidder will not generally deter higher58
valuing bidders from entering the auction. However, a lockup granted to
a second bidder may induce it to enter an auction it otherwise would not. If
the lockup is in the amount of bidding costs, entry is riskless. 59 Lockups
cannot prevent higher valuers from acquiring targets, but they may be used
to induce other bidders to enter the auction and, if they are higher valuers,
. the target. 60
to acqwre
From an ex post perspective, all of this is unobjectionable. Lockups
cannot reduce allocative efficiency and may promote it. They also increase
shareholder revenue. The important contribution of Kahan and Klausner is
to return the focus to the ex ante effects. Their distinction between firstand second-bidder lockups is especially apt in this regard. Whatever else
55
!d. at 1745.
56
Kahan & Klau sner, supra note 7. The threat of a hostile takeover is widely considered
one o f th e strongest promoters of managerial efficiency. Because inefficient companies become
targets, and inefficient managers will be displaced, managers have an incentive to perform. See, e.g.,
Edgar v. Mite Corp., 457 U.S. 624 , 643 (1982); Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case for Facilitating
Competing Tender Offers. 95 HARV. L. REv. I 028, 1047 (1982); Easterbrook & Fischel, s upra note 9,
at 2; Roberta Roman o , A Guide to Takeovers: Theory, Evidence, and Regulation, 9 YALE J. ON REG.
119, 130 ( 1992). The efficacy of the disciplinary effect may be significantly overstated, however,
because the legal playing field currently tilts substantially towards managers resisting a hostile offer.
See supra notes 27-31 and accompanying text.
57
Kahan & Klau sner, supra note 7, at 1546-51.
58
If the lockup is greater than the first bidder's expected return, it may prevent a higher
valuer from entering. Ayres comments that greater-than-expectation lockups are "extreme," Ayres,
supra note 6, at 684, and Kahan and Klausner ignore them as irrelevant to the argument. Kahan &
Klausner, supra note 7, at 1545 n.20.
59
Entry is riskless because the bidder will receive the lockup L if he loses the auction, and
will thus bid no higher than his valuation minus the lockup (v- L). He is guaranteed a return of the
value of the lockup, at a minimum. To be prec ise, risk is eliminated only if the bidder's valuation
exceeds his entering bid by more than his bidding costs (v- b > c). Since, by hypothesi s, L = c, this
condition amounts to the req uirement that v - b > L, or v > b + L. This is simply the requirement that
the lockup is less-than-expecta tion , which see ms reasonable.
60
See Kahan & Klausner, supra note 7, at 1548-49.
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second-bidder lockups may do, they transfer profits from the initial bidder
to shareholders. 61 They thus reduce returns to search and will dampen
62
takeover activity. Kahan and Klausner argue that second-bidder lockups
should be strictly scrutinized. 63 First-bidder lockups, in contrast, should be
64
analyzed under the business judgment rule.
II.

The Theory Synthesized

A.

Reactionary Failings

Kahan and Klausner are right to focus on the ex ante effects of
lockups . Their conclusion, however, rests in large part on faulty reasoning
because they discount the effects of current takeover law, fail to engage
fully the revisionist analysis, and neglect the well-developed body of
auction theory applied to corporate acquisitions.
The primary value that Kahan and Klausner ascribe to the market for
corporate control is that it disciplines managers by threatening them with
hostile takeovers if they perform inefficiently. The ability of takeovers to
play this role, however, has been seriously, if not fatally, compromised by
65
Delaware's recognition of the "just say no" defense . Recalcitrant
management may eventually be unseated; a would-be acquirer need only
wait for a shareholders' meeting, win a proxy contest, and have its own
61
The initial bidder may simply lose its search and investigation costs if a lockup induces a
higher valuer to bid. Even if the initial bidder ultimately acquires the target, it will do so at a higher
price. See id. at 1552-54.
62
The argument that reducing returns to search is undesirable obviously depends on the
premise that the current level of search is not excessive. This has been contested, with one of the
prominent points being that the first bidder can ensure some profit by buying 5% of the target's stock
at or near the market price before announcing its bid. See Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case for
Facilitating Competing Tender Offers: A Last (?) Reply, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 253, 255 (I 986). This
possibility, clearly, does not change between a lockup and a no-lockup world; it has no effect on our
comparison of the two unless it suggests that there is excessive search. But the excessive search thesis
appears to be disfavored. In fact, it seems more plausible to suppose that efficiency is best served by
allowing acquirers to capture all of the surplus from an acquisition. See, e.g., Elazar Berkovitch et a!.,
Tender Offer Auctions, Resistance Strategies, and Social Welfare, 5 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 395, 399
( 1989); Cramton & Schwartz, supra note 23, at 33 n. l4. Setting acquirer gain equal to social gain will
induce investment in search until the marginal cost exceeds the marginal surplus produced. If we think
that the surplus created by takeovers is real social value, this is the regime we would want. Clearly it is
not the one we have, and second-bidder lockups move us farther away.
63
Kahan & Klausner, supra note 7, at 1564-65. Kahan and Klausner advocate the same
level of scrutiny for "anticipatory" lockups, meaning those granted in anticipation of a hostile bid. !d.
64
See id.
65
See. e.g., Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985); Paramount
Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990); cf Paramount Communications Inc. v.
QYC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 43 n.l3 (Del. 1993). As mentioned above, the recent legislative
tendency has been to augment, rather than undermine, management's ability to reject hostile bids.
Recent anti-takeover statutes permit management to reject even offers that are indisputably in the
shareholders' interests by invoking the interes ts of workers or local communities. See supra note 27.
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directors redeem the poison pilL Yet, this process can drag on for years if
the board is classified, 66 and it offers ample time for inefficient directors to
67
remedy their conduct. Of course, hostile takeovers do occur, and they do
not all take place over a period of years. The flaw in Kahan and Klausner's
argument is not that managers can always fight off a hostile bid, but rather
that they would be foolish to attempt to do so by means of a lockup. 68
Lockups are not a good defensive tooL The first reason is that, as the
revisionists claim (and Kahan and Klausner agree), a lock.llp will not
prevent a higher valuer from acquiring the target. Management relying on
a lockup must gamble on the possibility that its chosen "white knight"
values the company more highly. More importantly, by doing so, it
acquiesces to the sale of the company and loses its far more effective
ab1"l"1ty to say no. 69
A second reason, which Fraidin and Hanson discuss at length, 70 is that
if the takeover is motivated by management inefficiency, as most hostile
takeovers are, 71 the target initially will have the same value to each
potential acquirer, because each will have the same plan (dump the
72
shirkers) to increase its value . Deals that entrench management will
reduce the target's value to the locked-in bidder; they can no longer fire
the inefficient managers. In consequence, a locked-out hostile bidder, even
if uncertain about the target's value, can confidently outbid management's

66
A "classified" board is composed of classes of directors, each of which comes up for
election in a different year. See I ARTHUR FLEISCHER & ALEXANDER R. SUSSMAN, TAKEOVER
DEFENSE § 6.05(a), at 24 (5th ed. 1995). Thus a nine-member board might be composed of three
classes of three, and control could not be obtained until two elections had taken place. "Cumulative
voting" can make it still more difficult to wrest control from incumbents. Under cumulative voting,
each share is allotted one vote per seat to be tilled but may cast more than one vote for a particular
candidate. For n vacancies, the n candidates receiving the highest vote totals are elected. For example,
when one class comes up for election, with three seats to be filled and 10,000 shares outstanding,
management holding 2501 shares would get 7503 votes. If management casts all 7503 votes for one
candidate, a would-be acquirer with 7499 shares (and 22,497 votes) could not put three candidates
above the 7503 mark and management would be able to elect one candidaie. Thus, even if management
holds barely more than one quarter of the 10,000 voting shares, cumulative voting would allow it to
elect one member of each three-director class. This would force an acquirer to wait three elections to
gain a majority. In general, with cumulative voting, a shareholder may elect m candidates (from n
seats) by holding x + I shares (out of y total) where x = (y • m)l(n + 1).
67
By shaping up their act and bringing the market value of the company up to what it
would be if managed efficiently, directors can eliminate its attractiveness as a target. From an ex post
perspective, the disciplinary effect might seem intact, but the would-be acquirer will realize small
gains at best. (It might, for example, be able to make a profit on the 5% of target shares the Williams
Act permits it to buy, see 15 U.S.C. § 78(m)(d), before the de facto auction starts.) The ex ante
consequence will be that returns to search for unwilling targets are low.
68
See Fraidin & Hanson, supra note 2, at 1827 n.344.
69
This is precisely what happened in Rev/on, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.,
506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986). A poison pill defense was succeeding when the Revlon board contacted a
"white knight" and thereby triggered its eponymous duty to auction . See id. at 177.
70
See Fraidin & Hanson, supra note 2, at 1809-10.
71
See Cramton & Schwarz, supra note 23, at 47.
72

See id.
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chosen suitor.
Lockups are thus also poor tools for serving management ' s disloyal
interests. Attempts to bargain for continued tenure are self-defeating. The
concerns that drive K ahan and Klausner's ex ante anxieties are not as
substantial as they might seem. Managers will use lockups neither to fend
off hostile takeovers nor to cut illicit side deals. More likely, they will
attempt simp ly to increase the value of their stock holdings by extracting
higher bids. The ex post analysis of the revisionists stands.
But I come not to praise Fraidin and Hanson. In the end, I will claim
that Kahan and Klausner have the more persuasive prescription.
Understanding why requires a more sophisticated analysis of the effects of
lockups than the reactionaries deploy, and this in tum requires the use of
auc tion theory.
B.

Auction Theory Applied

For analytical clarity, auctions are commonly divided into two types :
73
"common value" and "independent private value." A common value
auction occurs when the asset in question has an identical worth to each
bidder. The classic example of a common value auction is the auction of
oil leases. Because each bidder intends to sell the oil and has roughly the
same ability to extract and market it, the lease is worth the same to each
bidder. In an independent private value auction , the asset's value differs
for different bidders. Art, whose consumption value to bidders depends on
taste, is an independent private value asset. A further distinction exists
within the common value category: bidders may be able to discover the
value of the asset (common value with certainty) or they may not
(common value with uncertainty) .
Takeover auctions may be of either type. If the acquisition is
motivated by inefficiencies of target management, and each potential
acquirer intends to take the same remedial steps, the value produced will
be the same no matter which bidder wins the auction. However, if bidders
have different uses for the target and different synergy gains from the
acquisition, the auction will feature independent private values .
Real-world auctions tend to be mixed rather than a pure example of
either type: oil leases will have different values to bidders depending on
production costs, and the possibility of resale will inject a common value
74
element into art auctions. Nevertheless, an understanding of the effects of
lockups is advanced by considering their use in the common and
independent private value paradigms.
73
See id. at 28-29. Auction theory a lso contemplates different auction mechanisms, bu t the
Wil liams Act essentially mandates an ascending-bid auction, so this is the form I will discuss.
See id. at 29 n.47.
74
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1.

Common Value Auctions

As noted above, common value auctions are further divided into two
classes, depending on whether certainty about value is possible. The
following analysis shows the operation of both of these types of auctions
without lockups, and how the availability of lockups changes the
outcomes.
Assume that there is a positive cost to the investi gation required to
ascertain the common value and to prepare an initial bid (the "entry cost") .
Thi s is true of corporate acquisitions (though I do not mean to suggest that
many acquisitions do feature common values with certainty) since
potential acquirers need to investigate the target, line up financing, and
retain lawyers to draft the offer. Assume further that making a second or
subsequent bid is costless; this is of course not true, but the assumption
simplifies analysis and is roughly accurate, because the initial investment
dwarfs the costs of merely changing numbers in a document.
In a common value situation with certainty, there will be no real
75
auction. Only the first bidder will bid. After a first offer is made, any
other potential entrant will know that if an auction takes place, bidders will
continue raising their bids until they reach the common value . The
winner's profit will be negligible; given that entry costs are positive,
entering the auction has a negative expected value and no other bidder will
enter. The result of an auction regime would thus be that the initial bidder
wins the "auction" at his first bid- presumably a price marginally above
the market price. All the surplus (the excess of value over market price)
thus goes to the first bidder.
Use of lockups to subsidize bidding can produce a nearly opposite
distribution of the surplus. By granting a lockup to a potential second
bidder, target management can ensure this bidder a minimum return of the
76
lockup value. If the lockup exceeds entry costs, the second bidder will
have a positive expected return and will enter the auction. The bidding will
then proceed to the common value minus the lockup (given the assumption
that rebids are costless) and the target shareholders will obtain all of the
surplus, less the value of the lockup.77 Of course, the ex ante effect of this
prospect is that the first bidder, knowing that management will subsidize a
second bidder, will not enter without a lockup. Management thus will be
forced to grant lockups to both bidders and the sale price will be the
common value minus two lockups. In effect, target shareholders gain the
surplus but bear all transaction costs, since the value of the lockups must
75
See id. at 33 .
76
See supra tex t acc ompanying note 59.
77
If the target kn ows the valu e, it can extrac t all the surplus mere ly by threatening to
cond uc t an auc tio n. See C ramton & Sch wartz, supra note 23 , at 33.
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be equal to both bidders' entry costs
Common value auctions with uncertainty are the more interesting,
and the more typical, case. Assume that each bidder has equally good
information , and that all bidders know this. That is, each bidder trusts
every other bidder's estimation of the target' s value as much as it trusts its
own. (Bidders do not, of course, know each other's estimations at the
beginning of the auction.) Assume further that the estimations are
normall y di stributed around the correct value. Finally, assume that bidders
will not bid above their own estimations. Again, these assumptions make
the analysis more tractable by creating an idealized auction. To the extent
that real-world conditions depart from the model, its predictions will
suffer, but it is useful because it establishes the ideal from which
departures are made . The conclusions I draw about the effects of lockups
do not demand perfect accuracy.
Because bidders are uncertain as to the target's value, they will
update their estimates as rivals drop out of the auction and reveal their own
estimates. 79 In this type of auction, seller's revenue increases with the
number of bidders. This is so because sale will take place at the secondhighest valuer's adjusted estimation; that is the point at which only the
highest valuer will remain in the auction . More bidders supply more
information. Thus in auctions with more bidders, the second-highest
valuer's adjusted estimation will be closer to the actual value. If bidders'
estimates are evenly distributed around the actual value, the actual value is
80
the limiting value for the sale price.
The number of bidders is a function of entry costs and expected
return. In deciding whether to enter, each new potential bidder compares
the costs of entry (investigation and bidding) to its expected return . Thus,
iower entry costs produce more bidders. Higher expected return also
produces more bidders, but expected return is itself a function of the
number of bidders. As the number of bidders increases, each bidder is less
likely to win; thus, the expected return decreases for each new bidder.
78
See id. Since only two bidders are required to drive the price up to the common value
minus the lockups, management has no incentive to induce other bidders to enter. Indeed, it has an
incentive not to, since each lockup granted reduces the value of the target to bidders and thus the
ultimate sale price, as discussed earlier. See supra text accompanying note 42. Consequently, in
common value auctions with certainty, manage ment will subsidize only two bidders.
79
See Cramton & Schwartz, supra note 23, at 35. If Alpha refuses to beat a bid of x million
dollars, other bidders learn that its estimation of Target's value is no greater than x million. They will
use this information to update their own est imates; specifically, where n bidders remained before
Alpha dropped out, each remaining bidder will reduce its estimate, e;, by (e; - x)ln. That is, given the
assumption that all bidders have equally good information and are equally likel y to have estimated
Target's value correctly, the rational response to the discl osu re of the lowest esti mati on (rather than a
randomly disclosed estimation) is to revise by a fac tor that tak es into account the number o f bid ders
remaining. See R. Presto n McAfee & John McMillan, Auctions and Bidding , 25 J. ECON. LIT. 699,
722-73 (198 7).
80
See id.at721-22.
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Equilibrium occurs when entry costs equal expected return. Past this point,
no new bidders will enter. (This verbal description may be somewhat
opaque; the following section employs a more explicit model.)
The conclusion that follows immediately from the above discussion is
that low entry costs increase target revenue. But they do so only because
they increase the number of bidders, and any factor that induces more
bidders to enter will also increase revenue. In particular, lockups allow
management to simulate low entry costs by guaranteeing locked-in bidders
some minimum return. The analysis below will show that this is
undesirable because it reduces returns to search and increases aggregate
transaction costs. Less obviously, first-bidder lockups allow managers to
increase revenue by deterring entry. This tactic is desirable from the ex
ante perspective because it also increases returns to search.
a.

Using Lockups To Increase the Number of Bidders

I will employ a slightly simplified version of the model used by
81
Cramton and Schwartz. As noted above , I assume that each bidder is
equally likely to be correct, that estimations are normally distributed
around the true value, and that all bidders are aware of these conditions.
The model will show that use of lockups, by simulating low entry costs,
can increase seller revenue ex post, but that the ex ante effects of the tactic,
as applied to corporate acquisitions, undercut the ex post effects, with the
general consequence a reduction in shareholder revenue. In assessing the
ex ante effects, I make the further assumption that there are search costs in
identifying likely targets. I assume that these costs are born entirely by the
first bidder, since the making of a bid signals to other bidders that the
target is worth purchasing.
Each bidder decides whether or not to enter the auction by comparing
entry costs c to expected return. Expected return is the winner's profit p
multiplied by the chance of winning. The chance of winning is 1In, where
n is the number of bidders. P is the difference between the sale price and
the actual value. It is a function of n and the standard deviation between
estimations. 82
Entry will occur until the cost of entry equals the expected return :
c = p I n. At this equilibrium point, the last bidder has a zero expected
return from the auction process as a whole. 83 Importantly, all the other
81
Cramton & Schwartz, supra note 23, at 34.
82
Greater differences between estimations will produce a greater difference between the
sale price and the actual value. Thus winner's profit increases with a greater standard deviation. More
bidders will supply more information to the bidder with the second-highest estimation, and bring its
estimation closer to the actual value. Thus, the winner's profit decreases with a greater number of
bidders.
83
This bidder expends entry costs c and expects to gain pin, which by hypothes is equa ls c.

113

Yale Journal on Regulation

Vol. 17:93, 2000

bidders are in the same situation. They have expended c and expect to
recover only that amount from the auction. Management can induce
another bidder to enter by granting a lockup. Lockups increase expected
return, and so management can raise the locked-in bidder's expected return
above c. In this case, where a locked-in bidder enters past the equilibrium
84
point, the expected return of all other bidders will fall below c.
This use of lockups has almost no harmful effects from an ex post
perspective.85 Management has fulfilled its fiduciary duty to maximize
shareholder revenue, 86 and the corporation has been acquired by a highervaluing user. From an ex ante perspective, however, it is disastrous. All
locked-out bidders have negative returns from the auction process. They
will also have incurred investigation costs, and the first bidder will also
have incurred search costs. Anticipating management's use of lockups to
induce entry, 87 these bidders will be unlikely to search for the target and
will not enter the auction without receiving lockups themselves. With
reduced search, fewer acquisitions will occur, and the efficiency gain
created by transferring companies to higher valuers will be reduced.
Furthermore, since target shareholders are less likely to receive takeover
premiums, shareholder revenue is also likely to suffer.
b.

Using Lockups To Reduce the Number of Bidders

Given the threat of lockup-induced entry detailed above, no bidder
will enter a common value auction without some form of compensation if
second-bidder lockups are permitted. One obvious tactic would be for
management to grant a first-bidder lockup. This has been suggested by a
number of commentators as a way of increasing both shareholder revenue
and returns to search, 88 which would make the tactic desirable both for
courts and for scholars. Revisionists thus endorse first-bidder lockups as

84
Each bidder's expected return is reduced by each new entrant. The chance of winning
obviously decreases as the number of bidders n increases; less obviously, the winner's profit also
decreases since the sale price goes up. Since equilibrium represents the point at which the expected
return is equal to bidding costs, entry past equilibrium will drive the expected return below bidding
costs and, consequently, drive the net return below zero.
85
"Almost" because management's use of the lockup to induce entry is undesirable from an
efficiency perspective. By inducing another bid, it has increased aggregate transaction costs.
86
In addition to inducing entry, the lockup will also reduce the value bidders place on the
target. This effect reduces the sale price by the value of the lockup, and indeed, if the lockup is equal to
bidding costs, the increased revenue from the higher number of bidders will be canceled out. The
revenue effect will predominate if the lockup is less than bidding costs. It is possible to bring expected
return above entry costs c with such a lockup, since participation in the auction has a positive value
(pin).
87
Management cannot credibly promise not to use lockups, because it cannot bargain with
potential acquirers before they sink their search costs.
88
See. e.g., Cramton & Schwartz, supra note 23, at 36-37; Fraidin & Hanson, supra note 2,
at 1826-28; Kahan & Klausner, supra note 7, at 1563-64.
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part of their general panegyric; reactionaries exempt such lockups from
their philippic.
On this point, the revisionists are wrong for two reasons. First, if no
bidder will make a bid without a lockup, management's ability to choose
the initial bidder creates an adverse selection problem. 89 Management can
shop among potential bidders to find one that overvalues the target. Under
the full-enforcement regime that the revisionists advocate, target managers
will often be able to sell firms for more than they are worth. 90 Returns to
search will obviously be reduced. Second, the conclusion to draw from the
fact that first-bidder lockups can be useful to offset the danger of secondbidder lockups is not that all lockups should be permitted, but that secondbidder lockups should be prohibited. The danger of adverse selection is
reduced if bidders will be willing to enter auctions without lockups. They
will be willing to do so if there is no threat of management inducing entry
91
past the equilibrium point by granting lockups. Prohibiting second-bidder
lockups achieves this goal.
The reactionaries have the advantage of assuming that second-bidder
lockups will be prohibited; thus, they at least start from the appropriate
baseline. However, from this point they cannot advance the ball. They
encounter a serious problem when they attempt to explain why loyal
management would grant a first-bidder lockup, if not to compensate for the
danger that they might grant second-bidder lockups. As Fraidin and
Hanson point out, "[n]o loyal target would grant and no bidder could
credibly demand a lockup for investments already made in identifying and
. the target. . . .,9?eva 1uatmg
If the lockup is not compensation for sunk costs (that would be
irrational), nor inducement to enter the auction (that would be
unnecessary), what could its use be? After all, a lockup lowers all bidders'
reservation prices; if it does not induce entry, it reduces shareholder
revenue in an equilibrium auction. Kahan and Klausner offer no clear
answer to this question. They note correctly that first-bidder lockups do
not reduce returns to search, but do not explain why such lockups are not
per se disloyal. 93 Auction theory does, by showing that managers can
increase revenue by granting first-bidder lockups in order to reduce entry
89
Cf Cramton & Schwartz, supra note 23, at 35 (noting adverse selection problem).
90
This is a hypertrophied version of the "winner's curse" that attends common value
auctions generally. The conventional "winner's curse" appears as a consequence of the fact that the
highest valuer is likely to overvalue the target. It can be avoided 1f bidders adjust their estimations to
take into account the information revealed by other bidders who stop bidding. But if management can
obtain information about bidders' estimations without the bidders also gaining the information, no such
avoidance is possible.
91
Simply paying the entry costs of a later bidder has the same effect and must likewise be
forbidden.
Fraidin & Hanson, supra note 2, at 1814.
92
See Kahan & Klausner, supra note 7, at 1563-64.
93
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94

in return for a higher bid.
Denote the initial bidder 's estimation of the target ' s value by e. Both
this bidder and the target can calculate the bidder's expected return pin
from an auction that reaches equilibrium based on knowledge of bidding
costs and estimation distribution. This expected return will be less than the
winner's profi t p in such an auction, because there will be more than one
bidder. The initial bidder and the target thus can both do better than they
would in an equilibrium auction by negotiating a sale price s which is
greater than the estimation minus the auction winner's profit, but less than
the estimation minus the expected return from the auction for each bidder,
that is:

e - p < s < e - pin

(1)

A sale price in this range is higher than the anticipated sale price in an
equilibrium auction (e- p) , but the buyer still does better than he expects
to do by entering an auction, because s < e -pin. More explicitly, the
bidder and the target both know that in an equilibrium auction, the bidder's
expected return is pin. They both also !<.now that the sale price will be the
target's value v less the winner's profit p. (They do not, of course, know
the value; I discuss this point below.) The difference between p and pin is
the surplus created by avoiding an auction; it represents the transaction
95
costs saved. The bidder and the target can bargain over this surplus and
arrive at a sale prices where v- p < s < v- pin.
There are two problems with this procedure. First, it is a negotiated
sale of a company, precisely what the Williams Act ' s auction requirement
96
prevents. The solution to this problem is to grant the bidder a lockup in
the amount of v - s. This "expectation" lockup ensures the initial bidder
that even if the Williams Act delay produces an auction and the target goes
to another bidder, he will receive his bargained-for profit. The second
problem is that neither party knows the value. The solution to this is to use
the bidder ' s estimation. (Hence the use of e in place of v in the earlier
formulation.) In the long run, estimations will prove accurate; from the
perspective of repeat players, variations will net out. For evaluating the
efficiency of the legal rule, that is the perspective we should adopt.
There is one further difficulty that threatens to prevent the variations
97
from netting out. It is a variant of the "winner's curse" discussed above .
94
In equilibrium common value auctions , the target's revenue is equal to its expected value
less aggregate transaction costs. See Cramton & Schwartz, supra note 23, at 35. But merely deterring
entry, though it does reduce aggregate tran sacti on costs, will not ipso facto increase reve nu e. A higher
bid mu st be obtained.
95
See supra note 94.
96
See supra note 4.
97
See supra note 90.
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If the bidder seriou sly undervalues the target, it is unlikely to reap the full
benefits of its mistake; another bidder may well appear and snap up the
target despite the lockup. But if the bidder seriously overvalues the target,
the bidder may well pay more than it is worth, even though the bidder is
paying less than its estimation. The consequence of this is simply that
bidders will bargain slightly harder than we might otherwise expect 98
Of course, negotiation is always fraught with the potential for
strategic behavior, and there are complicated factors at play here . A bidder
may have incentives to understate its valuation in hopes of getting a
bargain. Other bidders may be hesitant to top even a "lowball" bid because
the danger of the "winner's curse" in this situation is real. 99 Management 's
leverage lies in its ability to offer a less-than-expectation lockup if it feels
the bidder is lowballing, or to opt for the auction if negotiations break
down. What can be said generally about this use of first-bidder lockups is
that it creates a surplus to be divided between searchers and shareholders.
It is hard to believe that it will not make them both better off. From an ex
ante perspective, first-bidder lockups in common value auctions are
desirable as a way to increase returns to search and to promote efficiency
by reducing the transaction costs of auctions. They also increase revenue,
but this effect is incidental from the efficiency perspective. Second bidder
lockups, by contrast, reduce returns to search and should be prohibited. 100
2.

Independent Private Value Auctions

Independent private value auctions occur where the target has
101
different values to different bidders.
In this auction environment, sale
will occur at the second-highest valuer's valuation, since that is where the

98
The adverse se lection that was so troubling above is not a concern here , because if
negotiations break down, the bidder still has a positive expected return from entering the auction . Thus,
he will make his bid and start the process. Management lacks the club provided by second-bidder
lockups and cannot extract information from bidders while preventing them from revealing it.
99
The "winn er's curse" is a result of the fact that in a common value auction, the bidder
with the highest estimation is likely to overvalue the target. In an ascending-bid auction, the effect is
greatly reduced. The information provided by lower estimators as they stop bidding allows higher
estimators to revise their estimates. If a negotiated lockup forecloses lower estimators from bidding,
the information they would provide goes undisclosed , and higher estimators are more likely to bid too
much.
I 00 Where the first bidder has received an exp ectation lockup as a result of th e negotiati on
process described above , second-bidder lockups will reduce returns to search only slightly. The first
bidder is indifferent to winning or losing the auction, and the only way in which the presence of other
bidders makes him worse off is by depriving him of a windfall profit where he has significantly
undervalued the target. This effect might be small enough that it would make sense to permit secondbidder lockups where the first bidder has received a lockup , if these second-bidder lockups served
some important policy goal. Because maximizing target shareholder revenues is not such a goal, there
is no reason not to prohibit second-bidder lockups.
101
In the takeover context, this will usuall y result from synergy gains . Bidders will have
different uses for th e targe t' s asse ts and, consequentl y , di ffe rent values for the target.
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bidding will end. Assuming that bidders' valuations are randomly
distributed , an increase in the number of bidders will tend to increase the
second-highest valuation, though the effect weakens as the number of
bidders grows. Consequently, shareholder revenue is increased by
102
increasing the number of bidders.
Second-bidder lockups, which can
103
induce entry, can therefore increase shareholder revenue.
First-bidder lockups, on the other hand , reduce shareholder revenue in
two ways. First, lockups reduce all bidders' reservation prices. They thus
reduce the second-highest valuer's valuation, which is the ultimate sale
price in an independent priva te value auction . Second, a first-bidder lockup
may deter entry. A bidder who values the target at less than the sum of the
lockup and the first bidder 's bid will not enter the auction. If the first
bidder is the highest valuer, the second highest valuer may not enter the
104
auction, and the sale price will be reduced. Target shareholder revenue
is thus maximized by permitting second-bidder but not first-bidder
105
lockups .
Maximizing target shareholder revenue has adverse consequences for
efficiency. In the common value auction, we saw, target shareholder
revenue and returns to search may both be increased by reducing
transaction costs. In the independent private value environment, no such
possibility exists. Returns to search may be increased only by reducing
revenue; here the tradeoff between returns to search and target shareholder
revenue is a zero-sum game. Thus, increasing returns to search requires the
reverse treatment: enforcing first-bidder but not second-bidder lockups .
First-bidder lockups, by guaranteeing some return, increase the first
bidder's expected profit and may also reduce the sale price. Second-bidder

102 See McAfee & McMillan , supra note 79, at 71 0 -11.
103 They may also be used to overri de " ratcheting bid s," as in Rev/on. In that cas e, Pantry
Pride offered $56.25 per share and promised to beat any competing bids by five cents a share. See
Fraidin & Hanson, supra note 2, at I 754-55. The lockup subsequentl y enjoined was granted to
Forstmann Little & Co., th e rival bidd er, in return for a bid of $57 .25. If the ratcheting promise were
believed , Forstman n Little would be irrational to make this bid without a lock up, and th e auction
would have ended at $56.25. See Revl on, Inc . v. MacAndrews & Forbes Ho ldings, Inc ., 506 A.2d 17 3,
178 (Del. 1986). In contrast to the Delaware court's conclusion, the Rev/on lockup was in the best
interests of shareholders. See Fraid in & Hanson, supra note 2, at 1754 -55 .
104 See Fraidin & Hanson, supra note 2, at 1806-09.
105 Fraidin and Hanson suggest th at collusive first-bidder lockups may in creas e target
shareho lder revenue. 1d at 1824-26. Their analysis is so mewhat implausible, beca use it requires two
assumption s: first, that th e target can iden tify a higher valuer, and sec ond , that a potential acquirer can
be induced to bid above hi s valuation in the expectation that the higher va luer wi ll exceed his bid . It is
more likely, in such cases, that the high er valuer will simply negotiate with the locked-in bidder.
Assume th at in such a negotiation, the target will be sold for a pri ce midway between the two
valuations. Let vi be the lower valuation , v2 the higher, b the bid, and L the lockup . The higher
valuer's choice is between 112(v2- vi) (negotia tion ) an d v2- (b + L) (topp ing the bid). The higher
valuer w ill top th e bid where 112(v2- vi) < v2- (b + L) , whi ch becomes v2 + vi > 2(b + L). That is,
he will top the bid if th e sum of the two valuations is more than double the sum of th e bid and the
lockup.
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lockups that induce entry reduce the probability that the first bidder will
win. They also may increase the price he will have to pay, and they clearly
reduce the value of the target to him; the cumulative effect reduces returns
to search.
C.

Policy Prescriptions

Asking courts to distinguish between common and independent
private value acquisitions is certainly impractical and likely impossible. 106
However, the analysis above shows that both types of auctions can be
107
regulated consistently . We have seen that enforcing lockups increases
shareholder revenue ex post in both common value 108 and independent
109
private value
auctions. From the perspective of maximizing target
shareholder revenue ex post, all lockups should be enforced. Courts have
thus implemented precisely the wrong rule to reach their stated goal. From
the ex ante perspective, the issue is more complicated. Lockups increase
the price at which acquisitions take place, but precisely because they
increase price, they reduce frequency. Sellers get bigger paydays, but there
will be fewer sales, since buyers will be less inclined to seek out targets.
Although it is hard to gauge which effect predominates, ex ante revenue
110
maximization might well require prohibition of lockups.
Of course, I have embraced an ex ante efficiency perspective, and
from that angle things look somewhat different. If the goal is to maximize
efficiency ex ante, first-bidder lockups should be enforced and second111
bidder lockups should be prohibited.
In common value auctions with
certainty, this treatment allows the first bidder to capture almost all of the
112
surplus, since no other bidder will enter.
In common value auctions

I 06 See Cramton & Schwartz, supra note 23, at 46.
I 07 From an ex ante efficiency perspective, the best way to "regulate" auctions might well be
to prohibit them. See id. at 50-51. This would require repeal of the Williams Act and proscription of
some defensive tactics. This Article limits its analysis to different possible treatments of lockups, since
neither of the above changes seems likely.
I 08 See discussion supra Part !!.8.1.
I 09 See discussion supra Part 1!.8.2. Of course, it is true that tirst-bidder lockups in
independent private value auctions tend to reduce revenue. However, target managers will generally try
to maximize revenue. See Fraidin & Hanson, supra note 2, at 1786-87. The danger of imprudent firstbidder lockups is small, so permitting tirst-bidder lockups-which is necessary to increase revenue in
common value auctions-does not threaten revenue in independent private value auctions.
110 The courts seem to have made two mistakes that largely cancel each other out. They have
erred first by taking an ex post perspective, trying to maximize sale price in individual transactions
without considering the general effect of their rule, which is to decrease shareholder revenue. Second,
they have failed to see that lockups, in the hands of competent management, do increase shareholder
revenue ex post.
Ill
Kahan and Klausner, focusing on hostile acquisitions, argue that first-bidder lockups
granted in anticipation of a hostile bid should be severely scrutinized. Kahan & Klausner, supra note 7,
at 1559. Because lockups are an inferior defensive tactic, this concern is chimerical.
112 See discussion supra Part !!.8.1.
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without certainty, it allows management to reduce the transaction costs
expended in an auction and thereby increase the surplus available to divide
11 3
between buyers and sellers . In both types of common value auctions,
enforcing first-bidder but not second-bidder lockups both reduces
transaction costs and increases returns to search, which encourage s valuecreating transactions.
In independent private value auctions, by contrast, the choice between
efficiency and shareholder revenue is more stark. First-bidder lockups are
beneficial from the ex ante efficiency perspective. They increase the first
bidder's returns to search and help the buyer partially circumvent the
auction regime imposed by the Williams Act. However, it is not clear why
management would grant first-bidder lockups, because they do not
increase shareholder revenue ex post. 114 Yet, concerns about management
rationality should not lead to greater scrutiny. Courts cannot distinguish
between common and independent value private value auctions; indeed,
the two types of auctions may intermingle. Because first-bidder lockups do
increase shareholder revenue in common value auctions , management's
offer of a first-bidder lockup may be no more than a sign that they believe
the auction is a common value auction.
Thus far, the prescriptions of this Article largely follow the
reactionary account of Kahan and Klausner. Courts should only enforce
first-bidder lockups . However, the theory underlying the suggested
treatment of lockups differs. The danger of lockups is not that disloyal
management will prevent value-creating takeovers. Managers have more
effective devices with which to do so. Nor will lockups allow disloyal
management to siphon off the gains from an acquisition. Lockups are
poorly suited for this role, because such deals reduce the likelihood that
the locked-in bidder will acquire the target. The problem with lockups,
from the ex ante perspective, is that loyal management will use them to
increase shareholder revenues. This will decrease acquirer profits and
reduce returns to search. Search is important not so much as a disciplinary
device-its ability to serve that function is undermined by the defensive
tactics target management can employ and is not affected by lockups-but
simply because takeovers create value.
This theoretical divergence may not seem important at first glance.
However, it will produce different prescriptive results if background
conditions are altered. Understanding what lockups can and cannot do is
critical when the context changes.

113 See discus sion supra Part ll.B.l.b.
114 See discussi on supra Part 1!.8 .2. Management is, of course , bound by its duty of loyalty
to promote shareholder rev enue ex post; the challenge is to craft legal rules which will lead
manageme nt 's attempts to efti cient results.
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III. Lockups in Bankruptcy
While mergers and acquisitions has been a hot field of late,
bankruptcy has not. Business bankruptcy filings, after climbing for two
115
years, dropped to 44,367 in 1998. But a glance at the data shows that the
number of filings cycles, and more than anything else, the current lull is a
chance to consider how to deal with the next wave. In particular, it is
important not to suppose that lockups in bankruptcy simply present the
same issues as they do in the market for corporate control. Mergers
increase in good times, and bankruptcy filings in bad, but the contexts are
not two sides of the same coin; they need to be distinguished in terms of
the appropriate treatment of lockups. Ascertaining the differences, and
arriving at appropriate policy recommendations, is the task of this Part.
Bankruptcy is a fertile field for the application of lockup theory,
although the use of lockups in bankruptcy transactions appears to be a
116
relatively recent phenomenon. First, a sale of assets in bankruptcy, even
if not conducted as an auction, has auction-like qualities, because a sale
outside the ordinary course of business requires judicial approval. 117 The
delay thus imposed, coupled with the vobability that a bankruptcy judge
will rule in favor of a competing hi . her bidder, creates an effective
auction. Second, companies in Chapter ll may seek out mergers as part of
a plan of reorganization and are sometimes the targets of hostile takeover
attempts. Finally, a number of scholars have suggested that Chapter 11
should be replaced by an auction of insolvent companies. In this case, the
proper use of lockups would again be important.
Given these facts, it is no surprise that courts have recently found
themselves forced to evaluate the use of lockups in bankruptcy. What is
slightly more surprising is that the bankruptcy law on the subject is largely
simply an adoption of nonbankruptcy law. 118 If the nonbankruptcy
treatment of lockups is misguided, as both revisionist and reactionary
scholars argue, then its mistakes must be considered; if bankruptcy differs
in relevant ways from the nonbankruptcy context, these differences must
also be weighed. I suggested above that the judicial treatment of lockups
may, ironically, be largely correct from an efficiency perspective. A
normative mistake (privileging shareholder revenues over efficiency) and a
115 See
U.S.
Bankmptcy
Filings
1980-1998
(visited
Dec.
2,
1999)
<http://www.abiworld.org/stats/newstatsfront.html>.
116 The earliest reported case appears to be In re 995 Fifth Ave. Assocs., 96 B.R. 24 (Bankr.
SD.N.Y. 1989).
117 See!! US.C.§363(b)(l994).
118 Courts used to reason by analogy to cases that held that the business judgment rule
protects lockups; currently, they seem more inclined to import the Rev/on duty-to-auction level of
scrutiny. See supra note 111. Neither analysis, however, is informed by a sensitivity to the unique
features of bankruptcy.

121

Yale Journal on Regulation

Vol. 17:93, 2000

positive mistake (thinking that lockups reduce revenues) combine to
produce the correct result. But though two wrongs may make a right, three
do not. Add to the above confusion the positive mistake of assimilating
bankruptcy to nonbankruptcy, and the wrong treatment arises again.
A.

Current The01y

The current theory on lockups in bankruptcy mirrors the first
generation's distrust of lockups in the market for corporate control. The
two most influential scholarly pieces 11 9 both call for increased judicial
scrutiny and parade first-generation horribles. 120 Neither of these writings
reflects the recent nonbankruptcy developments, and necessarily so given
that they predate both the revisionists and the reactionaries. More
surprising is the fact that neither displays a sophisticated understanding of
lockups, bankruptcy, or their interaction. And perhaps most surprising, the
academic consensus appears to be winning the hearts and minds of the
judiciary. While the early cases dealing with lockups in bankruptcy
displayed inconsistency in the level of scrutiny applied, 121 more recent
cases take a much harder line. Agreeing with, and often citing, the
academic denunciations of lockups, the recent cases argue that lockups
should be evaluated by courts and should be permitted only if in the best
122
interests of the estate.
The normative conclusion here is fairly unobjectionable. The analysis
proposed is similar to the one Delaware courts claim to use: determine
whether the lockup makes the seller better off. However, like the Delaware
test, this standard is unworkable because it is impossible to implement.
119 See Lackey, supra note 14; Markell, supra note 14. Hebbeln, supra note 14, reaches the
correct conclusion, but his note's cloudy reasoning has limited its impact.
120 Markell's general complaint about lockups is that they reduce sale prices. See Markell,
supra note 14, at 364-69. While Markell does not explain why managers would employ devices that
have this result, Lackey invokes the specter of management opportunism, which he claims is more
serious in bankruptcy. See Lackey, supra note 14, at 736-37.
121 These cases divide on the question of whether lockups arr. protected by the business
judgment rule. For an affirmative answer, see In reIntegrated Resources, Inc., 135 B.R. 746 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1992). For a negative variation, see In re Hupp Industries, 140 B.R. 191 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio
1992), which calls for higher scrutiny. In re Crowthers McCall Pauern, Inc., 114 B.R. 877 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1990), approves a breakup fee without discussion. 995 Fifth Ave. Assocs., 96 B.R. at 24,
takes a middle (and arguably incoherent) ground: Lockups are protected by the business judgment rule
unless they are too large and chill bidding. Presumably, application of the business judgment rule
would prevent the court from making this inquiry, so the announced rule seems difficult to apply. Even
the Integrated Resources court, however, remarked that "the subject court is charged with the duty of
reviewing the agreement to determine that it is reasonable in relation to the bidder's efforts and the
magnitude and signiticance of the transaction, and will enhance rather than detract from the bidding
process." Integrated Resources, 135 B.R. at 753.
122 See In re Tiara Motorcoach Corp., 212 B.R. 133, 137 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1997); In re
S.N.A. Nut Co., 186 B.R. 98, 101-02 (Bankr. N. D. Ill . 1995) (citing Lackey, supra note 14; Markell,
supra note 14); In re America W. Airlines, 166 B.R. 908,912 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1994) (citing Markell,
supra nole 14 ).
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Markell suggests that "the debtor should grant, and the bankruptcy court
should approve, a breakup fee only if there is a showing that the fee
induces an increased bid by the amount of the fee, and if the amount of the
fee correlates with the fee that other bidders would have received." 123 This
formulation is a nice example of the difficulties courts face in trying to
differentiate between lockups that increase revenue and those that reduce
it. Suppose that negotiation produces an initial bid/lockup package. How
can it be shown that the lockup increased the bid by a certain amount? 1l1e
standard seems to do nothing more than create a safe harbor for disloyalty.
Management can protect a lockup of almost any size by negotiating an
artificially low "first otTer" that is then "raised" in return for a lockup. 124
Because distinguishing between good and bad lockups is so hard, the
Delaware ex ante test collapses into a de facto relevance rule. EtTective
125
lockups may be enjoined. The bankruptcy approach similarly appears to
be in the process of collapsing into a strong presumption against lockups:
"[A]bsent compelling circumstances which clearly indicate that payment
of the fee would be in the best interests of the estate, breakup fees should
not be awarded in bankruptcy auction sales." 126
The central contention of revisionist scholarship is that distinguishing
between good and bad lockups is not difficult at all, because there is no
such thing as a bad lockup. I have suggested that while this conclusion is
correct ex post, it may need rethinking with respect to the ex ante effects
of a rule permitting lockups. Use of second-bidder lockups seems likely to
reduce returns to search, with negative effects on both target shareholder
revenues and efficiency. The question is what the import of these facts is
in the bankruptcy context.
B.

The Case Against Lockups

Markell and Lackey raise a number of arguments designed to show
that lockups in bankruptcy should be disfavored. An examination of their
major contentions helps to uncover both the aspects of lockup theory that
need to be updated and the relevant differences between bankruptcy and
non bankruptcy.

123
124
125
126

Markell, supra note 14, at 366.
See Fraidin & Hanson, supra note 2, at 1751.
See supra text accompanying notes 345-38.
S.N.A. Nur, 186 B.R. at I 05.
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Creditors Bear Costs Directly

Both Markell and Lackey note that any estate funds spent on lockups
reduce the funds otherwise available to pay creditors. 127 This is a
somewhat surprising point on which to focus, because the same is
obviously true with respect to target shareholders in the nonbankruptcy
context. The idea that there is a difference may stem from the fact that in a
bankruptcy sale of assets, the se ller corporation survives and pays a
breakup fee to a losing bidder. The direct effect of the breakup fee is thus
not to reduce the value of the assets to other bidders, but to reduce the
value of the bids to the seller. 12 8
Mathematically, the point is the following: If an insolvent corporation
enters into an agreement to sell assets at a price of $150 million and grants
a breakup fee of $15 million to Alpha, Beta, who values the assets at $160
million, will not be prevented from bidding. Beta will be willing to pay
$160 million for the assets. The bid of $160 million, however, will be
worth only $145 million to the selling corporation since if they accept it,
they have to pay the breakup fee of $15 million to Alpha.
It is, of course, mistaken to suppose that this represents a real
difference in the effect of breakup fees. Whether the breakup fee is paid
from buyer to seller and then repaid from seller to losing bidder or whether
it is paid out of the value of the acquired asset (and hence directly from
buyer to losing bidder), the money moves from the winning bidder to the
loser. 129 The only difference is the number of steps taken to get there. The
above example comes out the same if the breakup fee of $15 million is
taken to be paid out of the value of the asset, reducing its value to $145
million.
Thus, the argument as phrased does not relate to any real difference
between bankruptcy and nonbankruptcy. Creditors and target shareholders
both bear the costs of lockups directly; the Bankruptcy Code's focus on
maximizing returns to creditors matches the judicial structuring of
takeover law to maximize returns to target shareholders. That lockups
"come out of creditors' pockets"IJ 0 is by itself neither a difference between
bankruptcy and nonbankruptcy, nor a reason to scrutinize lockups more
closely.
There is, however, an important point lurking here . In the takeover

127 Lackey, supra note 14, at 721; Markell , supra note 14, at 374-76.
128 See In re Financial News Network, Inc., No. 91 B-1 0891 (FGC), 1991 WL 127524
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. May 10, 1991).
129 This does not mean, of cou rse, that lockups necessarily reduce returns to winning
bidders; only foreclosing lockups have this effect.
130 Lackey, supra note 14, at 738
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context, most of the academic commentary correctly rejects the judicial
notion that maximizing target shareholder revenue ex post is a worthy
goal. 131 In bankruptcy, maximizing return may be significantly more
important. The expected return in bankruptcy will factor into a creditor's
decision to make a loan, and it will be reflected in the terms of the loan.
Bankruptcy rules that maximize return to creditors have the effect of
making credit available more cheaply. Insofar as one wants to support
economic growth and activity, one might want a mle that maximizes
132
returns to creditors.
2.

Lockups Are Not Needed To Attract Bidders

Markell and Lackey both characterize bankruptcy as a "must-sell"
situation. 133 Because management actively seeks out buyers, they argue,
they do not need lockups to attract bidders. This claim seems to
misconceive the role of lockups; as Fraidin and Hanson persuasively
argue, "no loyal target would grant and no bidder could credibly demand a
lockup for investments already made in and identifying and evaluating the
target." 134 Lockups are not used to attract bidders.
Again, however, this argument illuminates an important difference
between bankruptcy and nonbankruptcy. The major concern about lockups
from the ex ante efficiency perspective is that they transfer gains from
bidders to shareholders and reduce returns to search. This reduction in
search incentives is significant when finding a profitable target is an
expensive proposition. However, the concern has less force in the
bankruptcy context, where search costs are greatly reduced. A firm seeking
to sell assets may advertise this by publication; a firm seeking a merger
may seek out and contact potential acquirers. In fact, the above approaches
feature prominently in the caselaw dealing with lockups in bankruptcy. 135
Additionally, while the would-be acquirer of a solvent company can buy
131
See. e.g., Cramton & Schwanz, supra note 23, at 28; see also supra text accompanying
notes 19-22. Ex ante maximi zation of the wealth of all (rather than just target) shareholders is a more
reasonable policy goal, but it see ms unlikely that maximizing the sale price in acquisitions contributes
to this goal.
132 Shareholders of course play a similar role in providing capital. But it is all shareholders,
rather than target shareholders alone, who do so. Maximizing target shareholder revenue ex post has an
uncertain effect on shareholder wealth in general. In contrast, the creditors of a bankrupt corporation
do represent the appropriate class. Moreover, maximizing creditor revenue ex post does not produce ex
ante effects that threaten creditor revenue, while the reduction of returns to search produced by ex post
maximization of target shareholder revenue does threaten to dampen the very activity that produc es
takeover premiums.
133 Lackey, supra note 14, at 736; Markell, supra note 14 , at 360-69.
134 Fraidin & Hanson, supra note 2, at 1814.
135 See. e.g., In re Crowthers McCall Pattern, Inc., 114 B.R. 877, 878 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1990) (offering memoranda sent to potential acquirers); In re Alpha Industries, 84 B.R. 703, 704
(Bankr. D. Mont. 1988) (involving the sa le of assets advertised by publication).
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no more than 5% of target stock before announcmg its intentions, 136 an
acquirer in bankruptcy may be able to do better by buying up claims while
137
facing no analogous restriction.
Thus, increasing returns to search, a
significant concern in the market for corporate control, is of lesser
importance in bankruptcy.
3.

Management Opportunism Is More Threatening

Lackey claims that management opportunism presents more of a
13 8
danger in bankruptcy.
It is certainly true, as he contends, that
management is more likely to be disloyal. In the takeover context,
managers may have some incentive to behave disloyally. If they want to
keep their jobs, they may reject acceptable offers. Once it becomes clear
that the company will change hands, however, management's incentives
mostly align with those of shareholders. Since the highest valuer will
acquire the company, and since inefficient management likely will be fired
by the highest valuer, management's efforts focus mostly on getting a
profit on its stock by maximizing sale price. 139
The bankruptcy context is quite different. Maximizing revenue, if the
company IS insolvent, is likely to help neither management nor
shareholders generally, because the equity stake IS underwater.
Management in Chapter 11 may thus have incentives to invest
140
inefficiently;
with respect to sales of assets or of the company, it has
141
little incentive to maximize retum.
To the extent that management can
use lockups to siphon off gain from auctions, it will do so by taking the
gain directly, not by profiting from an increased sale price.
However, the claim that management opportunism IS more

136 See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1994).
137 While the Williams Act probably does not apply to the buying of secured claims in
bankruptcy, see Chaim Fortgang & Thomas Myers, Trading Claims and Taking Control of
Corporations in Chapter 11, 12 CARDOZO L. REv. 1 (1990), there is some authority for the proposition
that it does apply to the purchase of unsecured claims. See SEC v. Texas Int'l Co., 498 F. Supp. 1231,
1240 (N.D. Ill. 1980). Additionally , it may be that buying up claims is sufficiently similar to proposing
a reorganization plan to trigger the disclosure requirements of II U.S.C. § 1123(a) (1994). See In re
Allegheny Jnt'l, Inc., 100 B.R. 241, 243 (Bankr. W.O. Pa. 1988)
138 Lackey, supra note 14, at 736-38.
139 See Fraidin & Hanson, supra note 2, at 1785-1804.
140 Management, as equity holders, is indifferent both to loss and to gain that does not
restore solvency. Thus, it may either take projects that have an expected negative return but offer a
slim chance of a very large payoff (overinvestment), or it may ignore projects with an expected
positive return but no chance of a large payoff (underinvestment). See Schwartz, supra note 21, at
1824.
141 This problem can be mitigated to some extent by tying management's compensation to
creditor returns, a technique used with apparent success in the Johns-Manville reorganization. See
Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Co1porate Governance in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of
Large, Publicly Held Companies, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 669, 689 n.76 (1993) (di scussing Johns-Manville
reorgani zation).
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threatening in bankruptcy requires more than greater incentives to
disloyalty; it requires some ability for disloyal self-promotion. The
interests of the management of an insolvent company diverge from those
of creditors. But lockups in bankruptcy do not seem to provide them with
an effective tool for pursuing their own gain. Continued tenure, the
compensation most often cited by opponents of lockups, is unavailable in a
bankruptcy sale of assets. Even where this is a possibility, i.e. merger
within Chapter 11 or an auction alternative, the Bankruptcy Code requires
the di sclosure of identities of officers- and directors-to-be, and a reviewing
court must find such appo intments or continuances "consistent with the
142
interests of creditors and equity security holders and public policy."
Furthermore, as in the nonbankruptcy context, an acquirer that intends to
retain inefficient management is unlikely to be the highest valuer and,
therefore, unlikely to acquire the target.
Conflict between creditors and the debtor 's management usually
reflects the fact that creditors prefer quick sales to acquire cash, while the
143
debtor prefers attempts to reorganize.
Lockups, which only come into
play during a sale, do not give the debtor any effective leverage in this
144
dispute.
Indeed, management's ability to help itself may be limited to
prolonging its tenure by dragging out the reorganization processsomething Chapter 11 allows it to do quite effectively. 145 However, while
this is a serious concern, it does not seem relevant to an analysis of
lockups. In bankruptcy, lockups are, if anything, a slightly less effective
146
tool of management self promotion.
142 See II U.S. C. § 1129(a)(5)(A)(ii) (1994).
143 See Schwartz, supra note 21, at 1807, 1821.
144 It would also be possible for management to use a foreclosing lockup to sell assets to
confederates at a discount. This is similar to the cash payment in return for a lockup discussed supra
note 40. It seems a reasonabl e response that if management is willing to go to these lengths to exploit
creditors, lockups are prob ably not necessary for their nefarious schemes. Additionally, the sale of
assets requires judicial approval, and a below-value sale is not likely to succeed where there is
evidence of self-dealing. Finally, awareness of this possibility does not affect the prescription that
lockups should be protected by the business judgment rule. A self-dealing transaction falls outside the
boundaries of the business judgment rule, and bankruptcy courts are capable of scrutinizing deals
between related parties, such as management-led leveraged buyouts. See. e.g., In re Bidermann Indus.
U.S.A., Inc., 203 B.R. 547, 552 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997) (refusing to apply the business judgment rule
to a breakup fee in a related-party LBO). Striking down a lockup in such a case does not rely on any
inherent suspicion of lockups.
145 For example, the Bankruptcy Code grants the debtor-in-possession exclusive rights to
propose a plan for the first I 20 days, see II U.S. C. § 1121 (b) (1994 ), and this period is often extended .
Lopucki and Whitford's empirical study, however, concludes that whether management will ally itself
with shareholders or with creditors is unpredictable. See LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 141, at 744.
If this is the case, lockups are even less to be feared.
146 See Markell, supra note 14. Markell makes no mention at all of why management might
want to grant a supracompensatory lockup; he seems almost to be suggesting that lockups should be
strictly scrutinized because management is incompetent, rather than corrupt. America West and S.N.A.
Nut, which both approve Markell's reasoning, similarly suggest that breakup fees in bankruptcy sales
of assets are a waste of estate funds without offering any reason why the debtor would be disposed to
s uch waste. See In re S.N.A . Nut Co., 186 B.R. 98, 103 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1995); In re America W.
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Bankruptcy Purchases Are a Bargain

Markell and Lackey share one more argument about relevant
differences between bankruptcy and nonbankruptcy. They claim that
purchasers of assets or companies enjoy substantial benefits because the
seller is in bankruptcy. This follows as a result either of the fact that a
company in Chapter 11 can reject unprofitable executory contracts and
147
assume profitable ones, or that purchasers of assets in bankruptcy are
assured of getting good title. 148 Both these assertions are true, but while
they suggest that bankruptcy sales should take place at slightly higher
prices than they would outside of bankruptcy, they are otherwise
irrelevant. The value of the assets being auctioned, and rules that may
increase that value, have nothing to do with the propriety of lockups.
5.

Summary

The case against lockups in bankruptcy, as it is currently stated, rests
on some very questionable arguments. However, these arguments reveal
important differences between bankruptcy and the market for solvent
companies. First, maximizing returns to creditors is an important goal.
Second, search is much less costly. Third, management will in some cases
be less able to promote its own interests by using lockups. Given that this
Article's earlier analysis suggested that second-bidder lockups work
precisely to increase revenue at the expense of bidders, it seems likely that
bankruptcy presents a best case scenario for lockup proponents. The
following sections take a closer look at lockups in a few different
bankruptcy situations.
C.

Lockups in Bankruptcy Sales of Assets

The points developed above apply quite directly to bankruptcy sales
of assets; these are perhaps the easiest case for the lockup advocate. 149
Under the restrictions imposed by the Bankruptcy Code, a sale of assets
will resemble a common value with uncertainty auction. As Part II.B
demonstrated, first-bidder lockups in such auctions play the desired role of
maximizing seller revenue; they also increase returns to search, although I
have suggested that this is not a serious concern. And since management
Airlines, 166 B.R. 908, 912 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1994). S.N.A. Nut, in fact, commented that merger and
acquisition lockup cases "are really not similar to the bankruptcy cases since most involve allegations
of breach of fiduciary duty by the directors." S.N.A. Nut, 186 B.R. at I 01 n.5.
147 See II U.S.C. § 365 (1994); Lackey, supra note 14, at 736.
148 See Markell, supra note 14, at 377.
149 It is thus somewhat surprising that the most fervent denunciations of lockups seem to be
found in sale of assets cases. See. e.g., S.N.A. Nur, 186 B.R. at 105.
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tenure is not an issue in a sale of assets , lockups are at best a clumsy tool
. 1oya 1ty. 150
o f management d IS
The judicial analysis of these transactions is insensitive to the theory
developing around lockups, and it is remarkable how completely
insensitivity translates into mistake. Courts assume that lockups can pose a
significant threat to target shareholder revenues ex post; theory suggests
this is unlikely. Moreover, the threat posed is almost uniformly
characterized as the danger of "chilling" bidding. 151 Yet theory shows that
in a common value auction with uncertainty, chilling bidding is desirable.
Revenue maximization and efficiency are best served by granting a firstbidder lockup in return for a higher negotiated bid. 152 Management may
also be able to obtain an even higher offer by subsequently granting a
second-bidder lockup; because of the importance of creditor revenue, these
153
should not be prohibited.
A proper understanding of the effects of
lockups in bankruptcy sales of assets suggests that they should always
receive the protection of the business judgment rule.
D.

Lockups and Takeovers Within Chapter 11

1.

Friendly Acquisitions

Friendly mergers do occur in the context of Chapter 11
reorganizations. 154 Such a merger may offer creditors considerably more
than they could receive otherwise, and may be the only way for an
insolvent firm to survive as a going concern. Where a merger is
contemplated in Chapter 11, lockups play the same role that they do in the
ordinary merger and acquisition context. The analysis developed in Part II
suggests that first-bidder lockups should certainly be accorded the
protection of the business judgment rule. In common value auctions with
uncertainty, such lockups increase both creditor revenue and returns to
search. In independent private value auctions, they tend to reduce creditor
revenue. However, management is unlikely to be able to serve any disloyal
150 Fraidin and Hanson make a strong argument against the idea that management can use
lockups to bargain for continued tenure. Fraidin & Hanson, supra note 2, at 1788-1804. And given that
this will often not be at issue in a sale of assets (unless divisions of the company are being sold and
will be preserved), management would be forced to improbable extremes of disloyalty to siphon any
gain.
151 See In re Hupp Indus., 140 B.R. 191, 194 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1992); see also. e.g, S.N.A.
Nut, 186 B.R. at 103; America West, 166 B.R. at 913; see also In re 995 Fifth Ave. Assocs., 96 B.R.
24, 28 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1989) (supporting the same notion without utilizing the "chilling" language).
152 See Cramton & Schwartz, supra note 23, at 34-35; discussion supra Part II.B. I.
153 See discussion supra Part !!.B. I .
154 See. e.g., In re Crowthers McCall Pattern, Inc., 114 B.R. 877 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990).
The Crowthers court did approve the breakup fee, without comment. /d. at 890.
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goals by granting a first-bidder lockup, and most takeove rs within Chapter
11 will be common value transactions. 155 Since courts are unlikely to be
able to identify the type of auction taking place, they will do better to
evaluate all first-bidder lockups under the business judgment rule. 156
Less obviously, and in contrast to the ordinary mergers and
acquisitions context, second-bidder lockups in friendly acquisitions should
also be evaluated under the business judgment rule. Maximizing creditor
revenue is an important goal, and since insolvent companies seek out
potential acquirers, the reduced returns to search are not a serious
drawback .
2.

Hostile Acquisitions

If managers of companies in Chapter 11 are more likely to be
inefficient than those of solvent companies, one might expect to see more
interest in takeovers of insolvent companies. One would also expect
greater resistance, because inefficient management knows that it is likely
to be displaced in an acquisition. Chapter 11 provides management with
defensive resources that significantly exceed those of solvent companies.
Management of an insolvent company may enjoin a shareholders'
meeting , preventing insurgents from replacing the board. 157 Managers
enjoy exclusive rights to propose a plan of reorganization for the first 120
days, and often gain more time from reviewing courts.15 8 Buying creditors'
claims against the estate, which carry power to vote on proposed plans, is
not as simple as buying voting stock because courts may disallow votes
that they deem were cast in bad faith. 159
The hazards of attempting an acquisition in Chapter 11 are welldemonstrated in the case of Allegheny lnternationa/. 160 Japonica Partners
tried to gain control of Allegheny by buying claims from its creditors.
Control over a sufficient amount of claims would have allowed Japonica to
block management's proposed plan of reorganization and compel
acceptance of its own plan. During voting on the debtor's proposed plan,
Japonica bought bank claims and senior unsecured debt in sufficient
155 Cramton and Schwartz clai m that most takeovers are motivated by management
inefficiency and hence are common value transactions. Cramton & Schwartz, supra note 23, at 47.
Assuming, as seems probable, that companies in bankruptcy are more than usually likely to be poorly
managed, the percentage of common value acqui si tions in that context will be even higher.
156 A basic principle of corporate law, but one that merits repeating, is that the business
judgment rule does not apply to self-dealing transactions. See. e.g., In re Bidermann Indus. U.S.A.,
Inc., 203 B .R. 547, 551 (Bankr. S.D.N .Y. 1997). Thus a management LBO would receive strict
scrutiny. See id.
157 See Fortgang & Myers, supra note 137, at 63 .
158 See id.
159 Seell U.S.C.§ 1126(e)( l 994).
160 In re Allegheny Int ' l, In c., 11 8 B.R. 282 (Bankr. W.O. Pa. 1990).
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quantities to obtain veto power. The reviewing court disallowed these
votes as being cast in bad faith under 11 U.S. C. § 1126(e). 16 1
Japonica also made a tender offer for subordinated debentures and
debentures of Allegheny 's subsidiary. The offer price was less than the
amount paid to debenture holders under the Japonica plan, and the
purchases were held to violate the Bankruptcy Code's prohibiti on 162
against discriminatory treatment of creditors in the same class.163 Finally,
after some members of the unsecured creditors' committee voted against
the Japonica plan, Japonica purchased their claims at a premium. This was
deemed "a naked attempt to purchase votes. " 164
The difficulties facing a hostile acquirer in Chapter 11 appear almost
insuperable. Certainly, as Allegheny International shows, management has
defensive resources far more effective than lockups. Thus, whil e
management recalcitrance is a problem in bankruptcy, lockups are not a
part of it. A desire to promote hostile acqui sitions should not lead to a
prohibition of bankruptcy lockups . Moreover, lockups do have beneficial
effects. As the analysis in Part II .B shows, lockups increase seller revenue
ex post. In the ordinary takeover context, the dimini shed returns to search
both threaten efficiency goals and make the ex ante revenue effect unclear.
But since, in bankruptcy, seller revenue is an important goal and search is
less costly, a rule that promotes seller revenue ex post is desirable . Once
again, all lockups should be evaluated under the business judgment rule.
3.

Policy Prescriptions

There are a number of reasons why companies in Chapter 11 may be
inviting targets for acquisition. An insolvent company is probably
relatively more likely to be mismanaged; thus the potential exists for
efficiency gains. And, as is generally the case, acquisitions may create
synergy value. The distinctive feature of bankruptcy is that target
management is more likely to seek out potential acquirers. 165 As a result,
there is less need to worry about returns to search. As already noted, the
maximization of creditor revenue is a more important goal than the
maximization of target shareholder revenue. 166 Maximization of revenue
requires that all lockups be protected by the business judgment rule,

161 See id. at 287-90.
162 See II U.S .C. § 1123(a)(4) (1994).
163 See Allegh eny lnt 'l, 11 8 B.R. at 294-96.
164 !d. at 297 .
165 See In re Financial News Network , Inc., No. 9 1B- 10891 (FG C), 199 1 WL 1275 24
(Bankr. S. D.N .Y . May 10, 1991 ) (o ffer ing me mo ran da sen t to po tential acquirers) ; In re C rowthe rs
McCall Pattern, In c , 11 4 B. R. 877 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y 1990) (same).
166 It is also indisputably the foc us o f the Bankruptc y Code.
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whether in common value or independent private value auctions.
E.

167

Lockups and a Chapter 11 Auction Alternative

One way of facilitating hostile takeovers in bankruptcy would be to
eliminate Chapter 11 altogether. Legal theory is replete with criticisms of
Chapter 11 . Many scholars have argued that it impedes the flow of assets
to their highest-valuing users. 163 Moreover, while the firm is in Chapter 11 ,
there are good reasons to suppose that it is not pursuing the course of
action optimal from the perspective of either creditor revenue or
efficiency .169 Professors Bradley and Rosenzweig argue that both
stockholders and bondholders do worse under the current Chapter 11 than
they did under its predecessor. The effect of Chapter 11 is to transfer
wealth from debt and equity to management. 170
Given these criticisms, there has been a surge of interest in
developing alternatives to Chapter 11. Most scholars propose replacing it
with some sort of market-driven mechanism, often an auction of the
company. 171 If an auction alternative is adopted, there is the further
question of how the auction should be conducted.
Differences between bankruptcy and nonbankruptcy suggest that the
primary goal for a Chapter 11 auction alternative should be maximizing
return to creditors, i.e., obtaining the highest possible sale price. 172 Auction
theory reveals that in a common value auction with uncertainty,
negotiating a first-bidder lockup and then offering lockups in return for
higher bids maximizes revenue. In an independent private value auction,
revenue is maximized by granting second-bidder lockups to induce entry.
The difficulty with these prescriptions is that the seller may not know
which auction type obtains. Moreover, the environment may be mixed.
While auctions may be divided into common value and independent
167 See discussion supra Part II.B .2.
168 See THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW (1986);
Douglas G. Baird, The Uneasy Case for Corporate Reorganizations, 15 J. LEGAL. STUD. 127 (1986);
Lucian A. Bebchuk , A New Approach to Corporate Reorganizations, I 01 HARV. L. REV. 775 ( 1988);
Mark J. Roe, Bankmptcy and Debt: A New Mode/for Corporate Reorganization, 83 COLUM. L. REv.
527 (1983); Erica Ryland, Note, Bracing for the "Failure Boom": Should a Revlon Auction Duty Arise
in Chapter 11 ?, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 2255 (1990).
169 See Joseph E. Stiglitz, Some Aspects of the Pure Theory of Corporate Finance:
Bankmptcies and Take-Overs, 3 BELL J. ECON. MGMT. SCI. 458 (I 972) (noting management's
incentives to overinvest); see also discussion of overinvestment and underinvestment supra note 140.
170 See Michael Bradley & Michael Rosenzweig, The Untenable Case for Chapter 11, 101
YALE L.J. 1043, I 047-50 (1992). Blll see Elizabeth Warren, The Untenable Case for the Repeal of
Chapter 11, 102 YALE L.J. 437 (1992) (offering a rebuttal to Bradley and Rosenzweig). The debate
over the value of Chapter II is live; this Article does not attempt to resolve it. It suggests only that if
an auction alternative is adopted, lockups could play a valuable role.
171 See Baird , supra note 168; Bebc huk, supra note 168; Roe, supra note 168; Ryland, supra
nole 168.
172 See di sc ussion supra Part III.B .5.
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private value for the purposes of theory, most will feature both sorts of
bidders. 173 Auctions of insolvent companies are likely to present the
possibility of gains from more efficient management (a common value
aspect), but there may also be synergy gains that vary across bidders. What
follows is a technique that maximizes revenue in mixed auctions.
Assume that potential bidders b 1 . . . bn have been assembled. Each
has an estimate of the target's value to it and can incur investigation costs
k to obtain better information. The board, or a trustee appointed to conduct
the auction, should, before entertaining bids for the target, conduct an
auction for a ratio of bid to lockup. Because a higher bid will produce a
larger lockup, the bidder with the highest estimated valuation should win
. 174
the pre-auctwn.
This pre-auction should be fairly inexpensive, because bidders avoid
all investigation costs and at least some bidding costs, in that they do not
need to arrange financing and presumably have less need of lawyers. Once
the winner b, of the pre-auction is determined, it incurs investigation costs
k and makes a bid for the target, incurring bidding costs c and receiving a
lockup in the agreed-upon ratio.
The seller obviously hopes that this offer is the highest bid br would
be willing to make at that ratio, i.e., that the bid and the lockup combined
equal b/s informed valuation. The seller also hopes that b, has the highest
informed valuation. If this is the case, the sale price will substantially
175
Because bx's informed valuation is
exceed that obtained in an auction.
private, and because no other bidders have incurred investigation costs, the
seller cannot be sure of these facts. The next step thus is to invite the other
bidders to decide whether the bid is a lowball, or whether they have higher
valuations, by offering a lockup in the amount of investigation and bidding
costs (k + c) in return for a higher bid. If other bidders think that the target
is worth more to them than bx's bid-lockup sum, they can incur
investigation costs k to find out. In order to give bx the greatest possible
incentive to make a high first bid, the seller should also refuse to entertain
176
subsequent offers from br.
173 See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
174 To see this , suppose Alpha believes the target is worth $145 million, and Beta estimates it
at $195 million. If bidding and investigation costs are $5 million, Alpha can offer a ratio of 28:1 to get
an expectation lockup of $5 million in return for a bid of$ I40 million. Beta can offer a ratio of 38:1
for the same size lockup-a bid of $190 million for an expectation lockup of $5 million. (The ratio that
produces an expectation lockup will be the highest a bidder is willing to go.) The result of a preauction in this case would be that Beta wins at slightly over the 28:1 ratio.
175 Return to the example in the preceding footnote, where Beta has won the pre-auction.
Suppose subsequent investigation confirms Beta's initial estimate. (Uncertainty about this does not
affect the general result.) If Beta bids based on this valuation, the 28: I ratio will produce a bid of
$188.28 million and a lockup of $6.72 million. This price is substantially higher than the sale price in
an auction between Alpha and Beta, since such an auction would terminate at Alpha's reservation price
of $145 million, assuming that subsequent investigation also confirmed Alpha's estimate.
176 It might seem that there is no reason to bar higher rebid s from the in itial bidder, as these
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With these rules, br has only a limited incentive to lowball because
this bid will very likely be topped, in which case br receives only the
lockup. If br shJdes down its bid, the lockup is likewise decreased. 177
Bidding so that bid and lockup sum to valuation produces the largest
lockup and hence the largest guaranteed return.
This use of lockups seems likely to produce an auction that
harmonizes efficiency and revenue maximization goals. By reducing
transaction costs, it should maximize revenue in a common value auction
with uncertainty; by allowing higher valuers to reveal themselves, it
should maximize revenue in an independent private value auction and
direct assets to their highest valuing user.
Conclusion
The revisionist account of lockups is convincmg in its ex post
analysis. From that perspective, lockups pose no threat to target
shareholder interests. They are likely to increase target shareholder
revenue; in fact, they succeed too well in doing so. Because management
has little incentive to worry about appropriate levels of search, and indeed
178
has a legal obligation to maximize shareholder revenue ex post, the use
of lockups is likely to benefit target shareholders at the expense of bidders,
thereby reducing returns to search. 179 From an ex ante efficiency
may simply reflect upward revision of an initial good faith estimate in light of competing bids. The
analysis makes sense ex post. However, since rebidding is relatively cheap compared to the initial
investigation, the ex ante consequence of this approach would be to encourage lowball first bids. That
would lead, in tum, to a greater number of auctions (as other bidders will be willing to top the lowball
bid) and greater wasted transaction costs. Moreover, a bidder can credibly claim to have revised its
estimate upwards in light of other bidders' behavior only when the asset has a common value that
cannot be known with certainty. It is precisely in this context that revenue is increased by deterring
entry and avoiding the wasteful auction. See discussion supra Part Il.B .l.b.
177 There may be room for bidder speculation . Suppose that the winning ratio is 20:1. The
informed bidder values the target at $210 million, and would bid $200 million, with a $10 million
lockup (I represent this bid/lockup pair as 200/1 0), if it were bidding "honestly." If the bidder claims
that its valuation is $189 million and bids 180/9, it does better on an expected basis if the odds of its
bid being topped are not greater than 20/21. (This follows from solving the equation
x(30) + (1 - x)(9) = 10.) Presumably, if its bid reflects a valuation below the second-highest preinvestigation estimate, that bidder will incur investigation costs to check it. As a result, bidders will be
able to lowball only by a small amount.
178 See supra note 20.
179 It should be clear that this is far more pernicious, in terms of reducing returns to search,
than management's ability to reject offers. Even if it were the case that hostile takeovers were
essentially impossible, acquirers could seek out willing targets and profit by acquiring them. But the
current structure of corporate law seems designed to thwart such a practice. The effect of the Williams
Act is to impose an auction regime even on voluntary mergers , see supra note 4, and management's
duty of loyalty has been interpreted to include maximizing the sale price in such auctions. See supra
note 30 and accompanying text. If management is allowed to use lockups to increase the sale price, the
duty of loyalty will require it to do so. The analysis in Part II shows that this technique has the
potential to drive returns to search below zero; consequently, the incentives to seek out even willing
targets will be drastically curtailed.
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perspective, the reactionaries are correct in their claim that second-bidder
lockups should be prohibited.
The theory underlying the reactionary conclusion, however, is not
correct. The reactionaries' focus on hostile acquisitions misleads them.
Lockups are a bad defensive device: because their use triggers a duty to
auction, management wishing to retain tenure will simply reject hostile
offers. Understanding that lockups are not used this way produces different
conclusions in different circumstances. In the bankruptcy context, search is
virtually costless and there are good reasons to promote the goal of
increasing returns to creditors. Since lockups, in the hands of competent
management, will have this effect, bankruptcy presents a situation in
which all lockups should be enforced, subject only to the business
judgment rule.
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